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NOTES 
Private Causes of Action Under Section 206 of the Investment 
Advisers Act 
Courts have frequently implied private causes of action under 
criminal or regulatory statutes to effectuate more fully the purposes of 
such statutes by encouraging citizen enforcement.1 Recently, two 
federal district courts,2 the first to have considered the issue careful-
ly, 3 reached conflicting conclusions whether to imply a private cause 
1. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) 
( recognizing action under section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971)(right inferred from fourth amendment); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (cause of action under Railway Labor Act); 
Texas & P. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 23 (1916) (implication under Federal Safety 
Appliance Act). But see Cort v. Ash, 43 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S. June 17, 1975) (no 
implied action under 18 U.S.C. § 610); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National 
Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (no implied action under § 
307(a) of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970); T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 
359 U.S. 464 (1959) (no action pursuant to title II of the Interstate Commerce Act). 
2. Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp, 260 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), (noted in 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 493 (1974); 48 TEMPLE L. Q, 433 
( 1975)); Greenspan v. Campos del Toro, Civ. No. 73-638 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 1974). 
3 .. Although violations of the Investment Advisers Act have occasionally been 
alleged in private actions, they have generally been asserted in conjunction with 
claims of alleged violations of other securities statutes and thus have received little 
judicial attention. See Kutner v. Gofen & Glossberg, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] 
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,r 93,109 (7th Cir. July 7, 1971); Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, 
Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Brouk v. 
Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot, 369 U.S. 424 
(1962); Angelakis v. Churchill Management Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] CCH 
FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 95,285 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1975); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 
F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Selzer v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Competitive Capital Corp. v. Yamada, [1973-1974 Transfer 
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,r 94,617 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1974); Jones Memorial 
Trust v. Tsai Investment Servs., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Young v. 
Seabord Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973); Skydell v. Mates, 59 F.R.D. 297 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); 
Schlusselberg v. Werly, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1f 92,012 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1967); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556 
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Levine v. Silverman, 43 Misc. 2d 415, 251 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 
1964). 
In Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEc. L. REP. ,r 94,761 (S.D. Cal. June 25, 1974), the plaintiff sought recovery 
exclusively under the Investment Advisers Act. The court's reasoning, however, was 
not elaborate and thus can be summarized briefly. 
The complaint in Gammage alleged violation of section 203(e)(5) of the Advisers 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(5) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § S0b-3 (Supp. Aug, 
1975), which gives the Commission enforcement powers over any investment adviser 
or "person associated with such investment adviser" who aids or abets the violation of 
any of the securities acts. The court declined to recognize an implied private cause of 
action for violation of this section. In reaching this decision, the court relied on 
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of action for damages for violations of section 206 of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940. 4 That Act, administered by the SEC, was 
enacted for the purpose of eliminating the "questionable business 
methods"5 then prevalent among the investment advisory industry.6 
precedent. First, the court pointed to two circuit court cases, Brouk v. Managed 
Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot, 369 U.S. 424 (1962) 
(noted in 13 STAN. L. REV. 964 (1961)), and Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 
F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 901 (1971), which it interpreted as 
denying private actions under the Advisers Act. Although unspecified violations of 
the Investment Advisers Act were alleged in Brouk, 286 F.2d at 902, the complaint 
primarily asserted violations of various sections of the Investment Company Act, and 
"[t]he court devoted its analysis ;to the Investment Company Act violations, appar-
ently assuming that the Advisers Act provisions were inapplicable or too similar to 
warrant detailed consideration." 13 STAN. L. REv. 964, at 964 n.2. Kauffman was a 
class action brought by a shareholder of 4 mutual funds against 65 mutual funds and 
the Investment Company Institute. The plaintiff alleged violations of the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts, the Investment Company Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and 
section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act. 434 F.2d at 731-32. The court's deci-
sion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint rested exclusively on the plaintiffs lack, of 
standing to bring a direct class action against, or a derivative class action on behalf 
of, those mutual funds in which he did not have any ownership interest. See text at 
note 148 infra. Thus, neither Brouk nor Kauffman would seem to be the sort of 
firm precedent on which a court, faced with the problem whether to imply private 
causes of action, should rely. 
Second, in dismissing the plaintiff's claim, the Gammage court relied on the 
Second Circuit's reasoning in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 
(2d Cir. 1966). However, 
[t]he analogy drawn by the Gammage court between its facts and those of 
Colonial is not convincing. In Colonial the court was concerned with whether 
a private cause of action could be implied for violations of Exchange rules 
promulgated under the mandate of§ 6 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. 
The Colonial court relied on the fact that the statute itself depends on the ex-
change to sanction their own members for violations. 
Angelakis v. Churchill Management Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEC. L. REP. ,r 95,285, at 98,464 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1975). 
4. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970). A third court recently refused to imply a private 
right for violations of section 203 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1970), as amended, 
15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3 (Supp. Aug. 1975). See Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., 
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 94,761 (S.D. Cal. June 25, 
1974), discussed in note 3 supra. 
5. Comment, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, l VAND. L. REV. 68, 69 
(1947). 
6. See note 73 infra and accompanying text. One commentator summarized some 
of the questionable practices as follows: 
In 1939, it was not uncommon for an adviser to arrange that one client buy a 
certain security and that another sell the same one. Where the adviser operated 
on the then commonly accepted basis of receiving a proportion of profits made 
by his clients, he could not lose by using this technique. The adviser's sole con-
cern was to seek new clients to replace those whose assets or credulity were 
exhausted. Adviser custody of clients' funds was the basis of most deceptive 
practices. Instead of buying and selling in the interest of the client there was 
frequently a shifting of high quality securities to the adviser's personal account 
and the placing of his unwanted issues in the client's account. 
Comment, supra note 5, at 69-70 (footnote omitted). See also Loomis, The Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 214, 244-45 (1959). 
In its 1966 report to Congress on the investment industry in general, the SEC 
summarized the regulatory function of the Advisers Act as follows: 
The Advisers Act, enacted as a companion to the [Investment Company] Act, 
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Within the reach of the Advisers Act are persons who "engage in 
the business" of investment advising or who, while principally en-
gaged in some other business, receive "special compensation" for 
investment advice. 7 Like other securities statutes, the Act requires 
registration with the SEC, prohibits fraudulent practices, and empow-
ers the SEC to discipline violators.8 An investment adviser registered 
under the Act is subject to possible revocation or suspension of 
registration for "willful" misstatements or omissions in his application 
to register, 9 for conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving a 
securities transaction, 10 for "willful" violation of a securities act, 11 or 
for "aiding and abetting" the violation of a securities act. 12 Section 
206,13 one of the few substantive sections of the Advisers Act,14 is a 
regulates the activities of those who receive compensation for advising others 
with respect to investments in securities or are in the business of issuing analy-
ses or reports concerning securities. Like the Exchange Act, the Advisers Act 
requires those subject to its provisions to register with the Commission, prohibits 
fraudulent practices, and empowers the Commission to discipline violators of 
the statute and of its rules thereunder. 
SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROwrH, H.R. REP, 
No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1966) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter SEC 
REPORT]. 
1. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(a)(ll), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(ll) (1970); Loomis, supra note 6, at 246. 
As originally enacted, section 203 of the Act excluded from registration an 
investment adviser whose only clients were investment companies. Investment Advis-
ers Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 203(b)(2), 54 Stat. 850. Investment advisers excluded by 
this provision from registering under the Advisers Act were subject only to the 
regulations of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -52 (1970), as 
amended, (Supp. IV, 1974); Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 
89 Stat. 164-66. In 1970, this exemption was removed. Investment Company 
Amendment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 24(a), 84 Stat. 1430. Investment 
fund advisers are now subject to the provisions of both acts. The present section 203 
of the Advisers Act exempts, inter alia, all investment advisers whose only clients arc 
insurance companies. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 
80b-3(b) (2) (1970). 
8. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 203, 205, 208-09, 211, 15 U.S.C. §§ S0b-
3, -5, -8 to -9, -11 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § S0b-3 (Supp. Aug. 1975). 
9. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(e)(l), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e)(l) 
(Supp. Aug. 1975). 
10. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 203(e)(2),(3), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-
3(e)(2),(3) (Supp. Aug. 1975). 
11. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(e)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e)(4) 
(Supp. Aug. 1975). 
12. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(e)(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-
3(c)(5)(Supp. Aug. 1975). 
Registered investment advisers must also keep "such records, • , . and make , , , 
such reports, as the Commission . . . may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in tho 
public interest or for the protection of investors." Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
§ 204, 15 U.S.C.A. § S0b-4 (Supp. Aug. 1975). 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970). Section 206 reads as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
( I) to employ any device, scheme, or artiface to defraud any client or pros-
pective client; 
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which oper-
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general anti-fraud provision. Its language encompasses a broad 
range of adviser misconduct.15 Because of its breadth and its similar-
ities with rule 1 0b-516 of the Securities Exchange Act, under which 
implied causes of action have been recognized since 1946, 17 private 
plaintiffs seeking recovery under the Advisers Act have correctly 
viewed section 206 as the most logical provision upon which to base 
their claims.18 
ates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client; 
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security 
to or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other 
than such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for 
the account of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the 
completion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining 
the consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph 
shall not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such 
broker or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transac-
tion. 
( 4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this 
paragraph ( 4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably 
designed to prevent, such acts, practices and courses of business as are fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative. 
14. The other major substantive provisions of the Advisers Act are section 205, 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1970), which prohibits investment advisers from entering into certain 
fee arrangements with their clients and requires the adviser to get his client's consent 
before assigning the advisory contract; section 207, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7 (1970), which 
makes it unlawful for any person "willfully" to make an untrue or misleading 
statement in any registration material filed pursuant to the Act; and section 208, 15 
U.S.C. § S0b-8 (1970), which makes it unlawful for any person registered under the 
Act to imply that he is in any way "sponsored, recommended or approved" by the 
United States government, or to use the title "investment counsel" unless "a substan-
tial part of his or its business consists of rendering investment supervisory services," 
or to do "indirectly" what it would be unlawful for such person to do "directly" under 
the Act. These three provisions can be said to "merge" into section 206. See 2 L. 
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1412 (2d ed. 1961). 
15. See text at notes 108-39 infra. 
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1974). Both section 206 and rule lOb-5 are modeled 
on section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(g) (a) (1970). See 2 
L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1392; 3 id. at 1427. 
17. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
18. Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEc. L. REP. ,r 94,761 (S.D. Cal. June 25, 1974), appears to be the only private 
action specifically brought under a different provision of the Advisers Act. In Brouk 
v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot, 369 U.S. 424 
(1962), the particular section of the Advisers Act relied upon by the plaintiff was not 
specified by the court. 
Most SEC actions taken pursuant to the Advisers Act over the past 35 years have 
also involved section 206. See references collected in 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ml 
56,356-400. Prior to 1960, the SEC had little power to define and enforce violations 
of section 206. This lack of enforcement power led Professor Loss to characterize 
the Advisers Act as "little more than a continuing census of the Nation's investment 
advisers." 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1393. In addition, the section was applicable 
only to registered investment advisers. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 
§ 206, 54 Stat. 852. In 1960, section 206 was amended to give the SEC the power to 
"define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent" violations of the section, 
and to cover all investment advisers, whether or not exempted from registration under 
the Act. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-750, § 9, 74 Stat. 887. This latter 
change was intended to bring the Advisers Act in line with both the Securities and 
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This Note examines the propriety of implying a cause of action 
for damages under section 206. Upon concluding that such an 
implication is appropriate, it then suggests a scope for section 206 
actions that implements the Act's underlying purposes. 
I. THE IMPLICATION DECISION 
Courts19 and commentators20 have devised a variety of theories 
for determining when courts should imply private causes of action for 
violations of federal regulatory and criminal statutes. In general, 
these theories have attempted to interpret and reconcile the few 
Securities Exchange Acts, which had established a pattern of extending anti-fraud 
provisions to nonregistered persons. See S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 
(1960). 
19. It has been said that, traditionally, courts have implied private rights of action 
for violations of criminal statutes when no express private right has been granted 
using either of two theories-the "statutory language" theory or the "tort" theory. 
See, e.g., Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule J0b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative 
Intent?, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 627, 631-35 (1961); Note, Implied Civil Remedies for 
Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 54 B.U. L. REV. 758, 768-73 
(1974); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. 
L. REv. 285, 286 (1963). 
Under the "statutory language" theory, a court will look to the language of the 
statute to find some legislative intent to grant a private right. The court using this 
approach is engaged in a form of statutory construction wherein it seeks to discover 
what the legislature "had in mind" when drafting the statute in question. See, e.g., 
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (finding 
grounds to imply a private right of action for violation of section lO(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act from the provision of that act that states that "contracts in 
violation of any provision of the Act shall be void"). 
Under the "tort" theory of implied private causes of action, statutes that primarily 
provide criminal (or, in the case of the securities acts, federal agency) penalties, may 
be used by courts as a basis for determining what constitutes "the standard of conduct 
of a reasonable man," so long as it is found that the legislative purpose in enacting 
the statute was to protect persons in the plaintiff's position from the type of harm that 
allegedly resulted from the defendant's violation of the statute. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). For a brief history of the tort theory of implied 
private causes of action, see 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 934-36. 
Courts, for the most part, do not expressly adopt the statutory language or tort 
approach to the implication problem, but the two theories taken together do provide a 
framework for understanding how courts have dealt with the problem. 
20. See, e.g., 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 943 (should ask whether there are any 
good reasons for not implying a private right); Ruder, supra note 19, at 643 (courts 
should look for "positive inference" of legislative intent); Note, 54 B.U. L. REV. 758, 
supra note 19, at 774-78 (private cause of action should be implied only when the 
act in question reflects a strong national policy); Note, Implied Civil Remedies Under 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 53 B.U. L. REV. 70, 96 (1973) 
(implication may not be proper when act provides for an express private right 
elsewhere); Note, 77 HA.Rv. L. REV. 285, supra note 19, at 295 (implication not 
proper when there is state law that pre-empts area or when there is an adequate 
administrative remedy); Note, Private Rights from Federal Statutes: Toward a 
Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 454, 469 (1968) ("If an adequate remedy 
is available . . . either as to deterrence or compensation, a private right should be 
denied ..... "); Comment, Private Rights and Federal Remedies: Herein of I. I. 
Case v. Borak, 12 UCLA L. REV. 1150, 1160-61 (1965) (implication may be proper 
when violations are very numerous and loss alleged is peculiar to plaintiff). 
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Supreme Court decisions dealing with the implication issue21-deci-
sions that, until recently, have left unclear the precise factors that 
must be present before the Court will imply a private cause of action. 
For example, in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,22 the Supreme Court 
implied a cause of action for damages in favor of corporate share-
holders under the proxy provisions of section 14(a) of the Exchange 
Act.23 In reaching this result, the Court focused on two factors: 
legislative intent, gleaned from the jurisdiction provision of the Act, 24 
to grant such a cause of action25 and the need for private enforcement 
to "supplement ... Commission action."26 Ten years later, in 
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Rail-
road Passengers,21 (Amtrak), the Court refused to imply a cause of 
action for injunctive relief in favor of potential rail passengers under 
section 307(a) of the Rail Passenger Act of 197028 (the Amtrak 
Act). The Amtrak Court focused on three factors: legislative histo-
ry, 20 tenets of statutory construction,30 and the legislative purpose of 
the Amtrak Act.31 In the Court's view, all three factors militated 
21. See, e.g., cases cited in note 1 supra. 
22. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). 
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). 
25. 377 U.S. at 430-31. 
26. 377 U.S. at 432. The analysis in Borak has been subject to two principal 
criticisms. First, it has been said that Borak's use of section 27 (the jurisdiction 
provision) of the 1934 Act to find legislative "intent" to imply a private cause of 
action under the Act is specious because 
. . . specific jurisdictional sections in federal statutes . . . merely indicate 
whether Congress intends federal courts to have exclusive or concurrent juris-
diction of actions arising under the statute. Without section 27 federal courts 
would have concurrent jurisdiction of suits under the Act by virtue of the 
"federal question" jurisdiction statute. Under that statute, the courts would have 
jurisdiction to decide whether a private right of action would not automatically 
result. An exclusive grant of jurisdiction should make no difference. 
Note, 63 Nw. U. L. RE.v. 454, supra note 20, at 461-62 (footnotes omitted). See 
also Comment, supra note 20, at 1161. 
The second major criticism of the Barak decision is that the Court failed to 
articulate criteria for deciding when a private action should be implied as a "necessary 
supplement to Commission action." See 397 U.S. at 433. It has been argued that 
without a clear indication of the "relative significance of deterrence and compensa-
tion," it will be impossible for a court to know when a private right is necessary in a 
particular case. Note, supra, at 465-69. 
27. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). 
28. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1970). This section provides, in pertinent part: "If the 
Corporation or any railroad engages in . . . any action . . . inconsistent with the 
policies and purposes of this chapter ... the district court of the United States ..• 
shall have jurisdiction ... upon petition of the Attorney General of the United States 
or, in a case involving a labor agreement, upon petition of any employee affected 
thereby • • • to grant such equitable relief as may be necessary or appropriate . . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) 
29. 414 U.S. at 458-61. 
30. 414 U.S. at 458. 
31. 414 U.S. at 461-64. 
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against implying a private cause of action for violations of section 
307(a). Neither of these decisions made clear whether, before im-
plying a private cause of action, a court must find express legislative 
intent to permit such an action, and neither made explicit how the 
various relevant factors (for example, legislative intent and legislative 
purpose) should be balanced. 
In an effort to clarify the confusion generated by its prior deci-
sions, 32 the Supreme Court last term, in Cort v. Ash, 33 outlined the 
framework within which the implication decision should be made: 
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute 
not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the 
plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted," Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) 
(emphasis supplied)-that is, does the statute create a federal right 
in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative 
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny 
one? . . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the 
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . 
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state 
law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would 
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal 
law?34 
Notwithstanding that in Cort v. Ash the Court denied the plaintiff's 
request for a cause of action, an examination of section 206 in light of 
these four factors clearly suggests that courts should imply private 
rights of action in favor of those injured by its violation. 
A. The Class of Benefited Plaintiffs 
In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court refused to imply a cause of 
action for damages in favor of shareholders of a corporation that had 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 610, a criminal statute prohibiting corporate 
contributions in connection with a presidential election. 35 Accord-
ing to the Court, the protection of corporate stockholders was only a 
secondary purpose of the statute; its principal purpose was to dero-
gate the influence over elections that corporations exercised through 
financial contributions. 36 Thus, because the statute was not enacted 
32. That !.lie decisions in Borak and Amtrak generated confusion can best be seen 
by comparing the majority and dissenting opinions in Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 421-
23 (3d Cir. 1974), revd., 43 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S. June 10, 1975). The majority in 
Ash distinguished Amtrak and relied on Borak, inter alia, to imply a cause of action 
under 18 U.S.C. § 610. See 496 F.2d at 421-23. The dissent read Amtrak as a re-
treat from Borak's "liberal" position on implication, see 496 F.2d at 426-29, and thus 
would have denied a cause of action under section 610. · 
33. 43 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S. June 10, 1975). 
34. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4776. 
35. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4776. 
36. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4777. 
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for the "especial benefit" of stockholders, it conferred no federal right 
on the plaintiff class. 
The first factor used in determining the propriety of implying a 
private cause of action, more clearly articulated in Ash than in prior 
decisions, is similar in purpose to the requirement of standing. Both 
serve to limit access to the courts to those individuals for whose 
benefit the statute was enacted, and, under each, the inability of one 
plaintiff to qualify does not necessarily preclude other plaintiffs from 
qualifying. While all statutes benefit or protect a class of individuals, 
all statutes do not confer an "especial benefit" or a federal right on 
any class. Similarly, because his interest is too diluted, a prospective 
plaintiff within a broad and amorphous class protected by a statute 
may fail to obtain standing to sue under that statute.37 It is doubtful, 
however, that the requirements are coterminous. The Court's use in 
Ash of the phrase " 'for whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted,' "38 instead of the weaker phrase used in standing cases-
"arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by 
the statute"30-suggests that the former test is the more rigorous. 
Moreover, the plaintiff in Ash clearly needed standing to bring his 
suit. That the Court found it necessary nevertheless to set forth the 
"especial benefit" test further indicates that the Court was construct-
ing a more difficult hurdle. 
Section 206 of the Advisers Act was designed to protect investors 
in general, and clients and prospective clients of advisers in particu-
lar. 40 While the exact limits of the benefited class are subject to 
dispute, 41 it is clear that Congress intended to benefit a relatively 
specific group of individuals. In this regard section 206 is virtually 
identical to section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, at issue in 
Borak, which was intended to protect corporate investors from man-
agement abuses of the proxy mechanism. 42 By way of comparison, 
the provision considered in Cort v. Ash benefited the rather amor-
phous class of all citizens and voters; the provision considered in 
Amtrak indirectly benefitted all potential rail passengers. Because 
violations of the provisions at issue in Ash and Amtrak could injure 
millions of individuals, public enforcement of those provisions seems 
desirable. Because violations of section 206 and of section 14(a) 
often damage only a small number of individuals, private enforce-
ment of these provisions seems feasible. In short, the specificity of 
the class benefited by section 206 suggests that those clearly within 
37. Cf. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
38. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4776. 
39. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 
(1970). 
40. See text at notes 140-46 infra. 
41. See text at notes 140-65 infra. 
42. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964). 
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the class should encounter few difficulties in satisfying this first 
requirement for the implication of a cause of action. 
B. Legislative Intent 
The presence of clear evidence of legislative intent either to create 
or deny a private cause of action is dispositive: Where evidence to 
deny exists, courts cannot fairly imply one, and where evidence to 
create exists, courts have a duty to implement that intent. In 
Amtrak, for example, the Court found explicit evidence that Congress 
intended the statutory remedy to be exclusive. The legislative history 
of the Amtrak Act revealed that a proposal to re-draft section 307(a) 
"so as to provide that any aggrieved party . . . could institute legal 
proceedings for violations of the law," was rejected by the House 
committee after the Secretary of Transportation objected to the pro-
posal. 43 Of course, legislative intent can be implicit as well as 
explicit. One technique courts have employed to discern implicit 
intent is to infer from the inclusion of a private remedy in one 
provision of a statutory scheme a legislative intent to preclude private 
remedies for other provisions.44 In Ash, however, the Court sum-
marily discredited this method of deriving legislative intent. A valid 
inference that the sought-after remedy has been precluded, the 
Court noted, arises only when, under the provision at issue rather 
than some other provision, plaintiff has some method for obtaining 
his desired relief.45 Finally, and perhaps most commonly, evidence 
of legislative intent may be absent. The Court in Ash made clear 
that, when this is the case, courts can imply causes of action if appro-
priate in light of the other three factors. 46 
There is no explicit evidence in the reported legislative history of 
section 206 that Congress considered the issue of private causes of 
actions for damages under that section. In Barak, the Court found 
evidence of congressional intent implicit in the jurisdiction provision 
of the Securities Exchange Act;47 it is therefore appropriate to exam-
ine the jurisdiction provision-section 214-of the Investment Advis-
ers Act, which reads in pertinent part: "The district courts of the 
United States . . . shall have jurisdiction of violations of this sub-
chapter or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, and, concur-
43. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 
453, 459 (1974). Explicit rejection of plaintiffs position by the drafters of an act is 
undoubtedly the strongest indication of "legislative intent" a court can find. 
44. See Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 426-29 (3d Cir. 1974) (Aldisert, J., dissent-
ing), revd., 43 U.S.L.W. 4773 (U.S. June 17, 1975). The remedy provided plaintiff 
under the Amtrak Act was to petition the Attorney General to bring suit for an 
injunction under the Act. 
45. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4778 n.14. 
46. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4778. 
47. 377 U.S. at 431. 
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rently with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity to enjoin 
any violation of this subchapter or the rules, regulations, or orders 
thereunder. "48 
In Greenspan v. Campos del Toro,49 one of the two decisions to 
consider carefully the propriety of a private damage action under 
section 206, the court compared section 214 with the jurisdiction-
conferring provisions of the Securities Exchange Act50 and the Invest-
ment Company Act,51 both of which provide that district courts shall 
have jurisdiction "of all suits in equity and actions at law" brought to 
enforce any liability created by the act. 52 The court concluded that 
because the words "actions at law" were omitted from section 214, it 
could entertain requests under section 206 for equitable relief only. It 
therefore dismissed plaintiffs damage action for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. 53 , 
Jurisdiction, or the power to hear a suit, and the propriety of 
implying a private cause of action, are issues easily confused. 54 The 
omission of "actions at law" from section 214 could mean either that 
section 214 does not grant federal courts the power to hear damage 
actions under the Advisers Act,55 or that Congress intended to pre-
clude the implication of damage actions for violations of the A<?t. ll6 
48. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1970) (emphasis added). 
49. Civ. No. 73-638 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 1974). 
50. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). 
51. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 44, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1970). 
52. This same jurisdiction-conferring language is found in section 22 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970), and in section 25 of the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1970). 
53. Greenspan v. Campos del Toro, Civ. No. 73-638 at 2 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 
1974). 
The Greenspan court perhaps believed that the difference in the jurisdictional 
statutes amply distinguished Borak. Although the Borak Court saw the jurisdiction 
section of the 1934 Act as evidence of legislative intent, see 311 U.S. at 433-34, the 
decision did not rest on this alone. The Court's examination of the purpose behind 
the enactment of section 14(a) was equally important to the outcome in that case. See 
Note, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 454, supra note 20, at 460. 
54. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 
U.S. 453, 454-55 (1974): 
In this Court and in the Court of Appeals, the parties have approached the 
question from several perspectives. The issue has been variously stated to be 
whether the Amtrak Act can be read to create a private right of action to en-
force compliance with its provisions; whether a federal district court has jurisdic-
tion under the terms of the Act to entertain such a suit; and whether the respond-
ent has standing to bring such a suit. Because the reference in each instance is 
to § 307 (a) of the Act and the legislative history behind that provision, these 
questions overlap in the context of this case even more than they ordinarily 
would. 
55. See Levine v. Silverman, 43 Misc. 2d 415, 251 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
56. The accountant-defendants in Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & 
Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), argued that "[t]he failure to include 
any reference to 'actions at law' can only be interpreted as expressly prohibiting 
damage actions under the Advisers Act." Reply Memorandum of Defendant Laven-
thol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath at 4-5. 
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The Greenspan court apparently adopted the first interpretation. 
The court failed to realize, however, that this interpretation does not 
resolve the implication question since it leaves federal courts free to 
assert jurisdiction under the general federal questionG7 or diversity of 
citizenship58 statutes: once jurisdiction is obtained, a court must then 
decide the propriety of implying a cause of action. Arguably, section 
214 is an exercise by Congress of its power to limit the jurisdiction of 
federal courts59 and precludes courts from asserting jurisdiction under 
any jurisdiction statute. Courts have shown extreme reluctance, 
however, to conclude that Congress has exercised this power and have 
done so only in the face of clear evidence of congressional intent. 00 
Because no such evidence underlies section 214, a court following 
the Greenspan interpretation of that section must still determine 
whether Co_ngress intended to preclude damage actions for violations 
of the Adviser's Act. 61 
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 
F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1966); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556 
(S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). See Jones Memorial Trust v. Tsai Investment 
Servs., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 
U.S. 426, at 426 (1964). 
59. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF TIIE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10 
(2d ed. 1970); Note, Post-Conviction Review in the Federal Courts for the Service-
member Not in Custody, 73 MICH. L. REv. 886, 904-06 (1975). There may be due 
process constraints on congressional power in this area. See Hart, The Power of 
Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise of Dialectic, 66 
HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953). 
60. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 752-53 (1975). 
61. The court in Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. 
Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), makes the point that it is possible to read section 214 so 
as to confer jurisdiction on federal district courts for damage claims brought under the 
Act. Relying on an earlier New York district court opinion, Osborne v. Mallory, 86 
F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), the Bolger court concluded that "defendants' argument 
overlooks the language of Section 214 which confers jurisdiction over 'violations' of 
the statute and the rules promulgated thereunder. . . • The term 'violations' is not 
limited to criminal proceedings . . • . It is therefore broad enough to confer 
jurisdiction on the district courts for an implied damage action such as the instant 
suit." 381 F. Supp. at 264 (emphasis original). 
In Osborne, the complaint alleged violations of section 17 of the Securities Act of 
1933, and sections lO(b) and 15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Defend-
ant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The 
court, in sustaining the section l0(b) claim, pointed to the language of section 27 of 
the 1934 Act giving federal courts jurisdiction over "violations of this chapter," and 
then said, "[t]he word 'violation' is not limited to a criminal case; it includes also 
civil litigation." 86 F. Supp. 869 at 879. The language of section 27 of the 
Securities Exchange Act contains the "at law" reference, however. See 15 U.S.C. § 
78aa (1970). The Osborne court thus merely determined that civil actions "at law or 
equity" were equally cognizable with criminal actions "at law or equity" under that 
act. The Bolger court overlooked the limited nature of the Osborne holding. Reading 
the word "violations" in section 214 of the Advisers Act so as to include civil 
violations as well as criminal violations docs not circumvent the problem of the 
absence of the "at law" language in this section. Read literally, construing "viola-
tions" to mean both civil and criminal violations, the section confers federal jurisdic-
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As pointed out in Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & 
Horwath, 62 the second decision considering section 206 damage ac-
tions, the legislative history of the Advisers Act contains no evidence 
that Congress intended to differentiate section 214 from the jurisdic-
tional provisions of other securities legislation. 63 The only reference 
to section 214 can be found in a passage of the Senate report64 that 
comments on the enforcement provisions of the Act in general; it 
states that they are "generally comparable" to those of the Investment 
Company Act, 65 the jurisdiction section of which contains the "at 
law" language. 66 This comparison negates any inference from 
section 214 that, by omitting the "at law" language, Congress expli-
citly intended to preclude damage actions under the Advisers Act. 
Other methods of deriving implicit legislative. intent yield equally 
inconclusive results. Section 215(b) of the Advisers Act67 provides 
that "[e]very contract made in violation of any provision of this 
subchapter ... shall be void .... " The court in Kardon v. 
National Gypsum Co.68 viewed a similar provision in the Securities 
Exchange Act as affirmative evidence of congressional intent to allow 
private parties to assert claims under that Act. While such an 
inference from section 215 is possible, it is arguably offset by indica-
tions in the Act's legislative history of congressional reluctance to 
"over-regulate" the advisory industry,60 which suggest a desire to 
tion over all violations "of all suits in equity" and still excludes the assertion of 
jurisdiction over private damage claims. 
The Bolger court's alternative explanation of how to read section 214 is perhaps 
more accurate: "Unlike each of the other securities laws, the Advisers Act does not 
contain any provision expressly authorizing a civil action by a private person injured 
by a violation of one of the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, it was necessary in 
those statutes to make reference to 'actions at law' in the jurisdictional sections. Such 
a provision was unnecessary in the Advisers Act." 381 F. Supp. at 264-65 (emphasis 
original; footnote omitted). In the absence of any evidence that Congress intended 
to single out this Act as one under which private rights, whether express or implied, 
were inappropriate, this may very well explain why section 214 was drafted as it was. 
62. 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
63. 381 F. Supp. at 264. 
64. S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 23 (1940). 
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970). 
66. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 44, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1970). 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(b) (1970). 
68. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
69. It is clear that, as enacted, the Investment Advisers Act represented a 
compromise between the SEC and the investment advisory industry. See S. REP. No. 
1775, supra note 64, at 20-21. In the congressional debate over the passage of the 
Advisers Act, concern over weaknesses in the regulatory aspects of the Act, such as 
the exemption from registration for lawyers, accountants, and teachers who give 
investment advice only "incidental[ly]" to their main business, § 202(a)(ll}(B), 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll}(B) (1970), and the lack of any educational or professional 
requirements for registration under the Act, was voiced. See 86 CONG. REC. 9814 
(1940) (remarks of Representative Hinshaw). Because there was strong congres-
sional feeling that both the investment company and investment advisory industries 
were essential to the national economy and should not be jeopardized, see 86 CONG. 
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minimize the potential liability of advisers. 70 In sum, there is neither 
explicit nor implicit evidence of congressional intent to create or deny 
a cause of action for damages under section 206. 
C. Legislative Purpose 
Like the other securities acts, the Investment Advisers Act is both 
"remedial" and regulatory;71 its principal purpose is the encourage-
ment of investment by providing adequate protection against fraudu-
lent manipulations by dishonest advisers. 72 The relevant report of 
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency states: "The nature 
of the functions of investment advisers, their increasing widespread 
activities, their potential influence on security markets and the dan-
gerous potentialities of stock market tipsters imposing upon unsophis-
ticated investors, convinces this committee that protection of investors 
requires the regulation of investment advisers on a national scale."73 
In 1940 Congress was particularly concerned with the state of the 
economy; industry in general and the defense industry in particular 
needed the financial impetus that private investment could provide.74 
Following the stock market crash of 1929, the public had become 
increasingly cautious about investing without professional consulta-
REC. 9815 (remarks of Representative Wolverton), the Advisers Act was enacted 
without additional restrictions. 
The lack of educational requirements for registration as an investment adviser 
under the Act has been seen by commentators as the "major" inadequacy of the Act, 
See 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1415; Comment, supra note 6, at 75. Cf. 
Marketlines, Inc. v. SEC, 384 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1967) (the occupation of 
investment adviser is "an occupation which can cause havoc unless engaged in by 
those with appropriate background and standards"). 
70. See Note, The Regulation of Investment Advisers,, 14 STAN. L. REV, 827, 837 
(1962). 
71. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). 
72. See note 6, supra, for examples of advisory industry practices that led to the 
enactment of the Investment Advisers Act. 
73. S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 64, at 21. See also H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th 
Cong., 3d Sess. 28 (1940): "The essential purpose of [the Advisers Act] is to protect 
the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of unscrupulous tipsters and touts 
and to safeguard the honest investment adviser against the stigma of the activities of 
these individuals by making fraudulent practices by investment advisers unlawful," 
74. The congressional reports accompanying the Investment Company Act of 
1940, title I of the bill of which the Advisers Act was title II, are illuminating in this 
respect. The Senate report states: "Finally, a most significant function of investment 
companies in relation to the immediate needs of the national economy is their 
potential usefulness in the supply of new capital to industry, particularly to small and 
promotional ventures. . . . [I]t is the hope of the committee • . . that regulation of 
investment companies, as provided for in this bill, may stimulate venture capital and 
the financing of industry." S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 64, at 5. The House report 
adds: "[P]roper and reasonable regulation of investment companies may substantially 
stimulate investment companies to supply new capital for the expansion of industry, 
particularly industries vital to the national defense ...• " H.R. REP. No, 2639, 
supra note 73, at 5. 
December 1975] Section 206 Private Actions 321 
tion. 711 Aware of and seeking to protect the "fiduciary nature" of the 
relationship between adviser and client, 76 Congress passed the Advis-
ers Act with the aim of "substitut[ing] a philosophy of full disclosure 
for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus . . . achiev[ing] a high 
standard of business ethics in the securities industry."77 
Given these underlying purposes, the implication of a private 
cause of action under section 206 is appropriate. First, it is obvious 
that section 206 is similar to section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 
considered in Barak. Both provisions protect investors by proscrib-
ing certain manipulative practices and both are ostensibly enforced by 
the SEC. In Barak, the Court implied a cause of action for dam-
ages;78 the same result seems warranted under section 206. 
Second, the remedies expressly provided in the Advisers Act for 
violations of its provisions are insufficient to accord full relief to 
injured clients and are by no means frustrated by the implication of a 
cause of action for damages. Section 206 ( 4) of the Advisers Act79 
grants the SEC the power to define and "prescribe means reasonably 
designed to prevent" fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative acts for 
the purpose of determining what constitutes a violation of that provi-
sion. 80 The Commission's enforcement powers, set forth in section 
203(e),81 are in general limited to denying registration to, revoking 
or suspending the registration of, placing limitations on the activities 
of, or "censuring"82 an investment adviser who violates the Advisers 
Act, "if it finds . . . that such censure, denial, placing of limitations, 
suspension, or revocation is in the public interest."83 The Commis-
sion is given full "investigative" powers under the Act, "[w]henever 
it shall appear to the Commission, either upon complaint or other-
75. See Comment, supra note 6, at 69. 
76. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 
(1963) (summarizing the legislative history). 
77. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) 
(footnote omitted). 
78. The Borak Court found that the "protection of investors" language in section 
14(a) "implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that 
result." 377 U.S. at 432. 
79. For the text of this provision, see note 13 supra. 
80. For a discussion of how the SEC has interpreted section 206, see text at notes 
107-35 infra. 
81. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e) (Supp. Aug. 1975). 
82. Section 206 was amended in 1960 to apply to all investment advisers, whether 
registered under the Act or not. See note 18 supra. Until the 1975 amendment to 
the Act that added the phrase "placing limitations on the activities of," Commission 
"censure" was the only form of enforcing the prohibitions of section 206 against 
unregistered advisers, aside from possible imposition of criminal penalties. The 
Commission also uses the more lenient "censure" device against advisers who have 
violated the Act when it finds "mitigating circumstances"-usually an attempt by the 
adviser to make good his wrong. See, e.g., Axe Securities Corp., 42 S.E.C. 381, 384 
(1964). 
83. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e) (Supp._Aug. 1975). 
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wise, that the provisions of [the Act] or of any rule or regulation 
prescribed under the authority thereof, have been or are about to be 
violated by any person."84 The Commission may, "in its discretion," 
bring a district court action to enjoin violations of the Act, or it may 
transmit evidence of such a violation to the Attorney General, "who, 
in his discretion, may institute the appropriate criminal proceed-
ing."s5 
Thus, the only remedy provided by the Act to investors who are 
injured by the fraudulent acts of their advisers is to file a complaint 
with the SEC and await Commission action. 86 While in Amtrak the 
Court found a similar remedy87 sufficiently effective to implement the 
purposes of the Amtrak Act, 88 the situation of the plaintiff passenger 
association in that case is clearly distinguishable. First, the principal 
purpose of the Amtrak Act was not to protect the plaintiffs. Second, 
the plaintiff in Amtrak sought a remedy-an injunction halting a pro-
posed rail line discontinuance-already provided by the Act, al-
though in a less direct manner. Finally, there existed clear evidence 
that Congress intended the statutory remedy to be exclusive. On the 
other hand, the principal purpose of the Advisers Act is to protect 
investors, plaintiffs asserting a damage claim under section 206 seek a 
remedy not provided by the Act, and there is no evidence that 
Congress wanted the statutory remedy to be exclusive. Cort v. Ash is 
also of little guidance, for there the remedy sought was one tradition-
ally provided by state corporation laws. From this fact, the Court 
inferred that Congress intended to leave the remedy to the discretion 
of the states.80 Because the regulation of investment advisers is 
predominated by federal supervision, 00 such an inference in the con-
text of section 206 is unreasonable. 
Finally, the implication of a cause of action for damages under 
section 206 protects investors more fully. In Borak, the Court 
84. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(a) (1970). 
85. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1970). 
86. An argument might be advanced here, based on the maxim of statutory 
construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that the expression of one remedy in 
the Advisers Act implies that other remedies are precluded. Cf. National R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). 
However, use of exclusio unius was discredited in the context of private actions by the 
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash. See text at note 45 supra. Cf. Comment, Prival£' 
Rights of Action Against Mutual Fund Investment Advisers: Amended Section 36 of 
the 1940 Act, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 143, 158-60 (1971) (rejecting the argument with 
respect to section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940). 
87. Plaintiff's remedy under the Amtrak Act is to file a complaint with the 
Attorney General of the United States. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 
National Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 465 (1974) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in result). 
88. 414 U.S. at 464. 
89. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4778. 
90. See text at notes 102-05 infra. 
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supported its implication of a damage action by noting the inability of 
the SEC to examine carefully all of the proxy statements it received01 
and by noting the deterrent value of private damage actions. 02 Simi-
larly, the SEC cannot supervise and investigate the activities of all 
advisers, and section 206 private damage actions would doubtless 
encourage compliance. 93 Both Congress04 and the SEC95 have 
voiced concern over the adequacy of enforcement of the Advisers Act. 
Allowing private plaintiffs to sue under section 206 would serve to 
"supplement" SEC enforcement and thus would aid the SEC in 
"maintaining the confidence of the public in the processes of capital 
formation and securities trading."96 Such private actions would also 
serve to compensate plaintiffs for what oftentimes are egregious 
losses°7-a result consistent with that of many recent cases adopting 
a liberal approach toward allowing recovery under various provisions 
of the securities acts. 98 Any concern over subjecting investment ad-
visers to undue liability that stems from the fact that Congress has 
never seen fit to regulate the day-to-day activities of advisers can be 
accommodated by carefully "shaping" the right of action under sec-
tion 206, rather than by denying it altogether. In sum, the implication 
of a private cause of action for damages under section 206 would be 
consistent with, and in fact would further, the underlying purpose of 
the Act. 
91. 377 U.S. at 432. 
92. 377 U.S. at 432. 
93. The SEC is empowered to investigate advisers only after it has reason to 
believe that the Act has been or is about to be violated. Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, § 209(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(a) (1970). Knowledge of possible civil damage 
liability would undoubtedly have a stronger deterrent effect than would knowledge 
that, if the violation is brought to the attention of the SEC, that agency may then 
begin to investigate. 
94. See S. REP. No. 1760, supra note 18, at 4: "A major concern of the bill [to 
amend the Investment Advisers Act] is to aid the Commission in enforcing compli-
ance with the act. There are at present over ½ million individuals in the United 
States who own corporate securities, .nearly double those•in 1952 . . . . [11his new 
group offers strong temptation to confidence men and swindlers who may give them 
biased advice or misuse their funds or securities." 
95. See SEC REPORT, supra note 6, at 343-46. 
96. SEC, REPORT OF TIIE ADVISORY COMM. ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES 5 ( 1972). The SEC filed an amicus curiae memorandum supporting a 
claim for a private right of action under the Advisers Act in Hull v. Newman, 
Kennedy & Co., No. 118-283 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1957). The Hull case was 
apparently settled before this issue was resolved. 
97. See, e.g., Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 
260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ($2.4 million damages alleged). 
98. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 ( 1972); 
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Chris-Craft 
Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
910 (1973); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). 
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D. StateLaw 
The final factor set forth in Ash is whether the cause of action is 
one traditionally relegated to state law and in an area in which state 
law predominates.99 In Cort v. Ash, plaintiff stockholders sought to 
require defendant corporate directors to repay corporate funds illegal-
ly expended on a presidential election.100 The Court found signifi-
cant the fact that state law regulates the relationships between share-
holders, corporations, and corporate directors, and provides methods 
for shareholders to remedy director actions that are ultra vires.101 
Because the area was pervaded by state law and not one traditionally 
the subject of federal regulation, this factor in Ash militated against 
the implication of a federal cause of action. 
State law in the context of investor/ advisor relations is and tradi-
tionally has been sparse.102 Although twenty-seven states now have 
anti-fraud statutes that deal specifically with the dispensing of invest-
ment advice, 103 most of these statutes have only recently been enacted 
and only one expressly provides for a civil cause of action against 
fraudulent investment advisers.104 Moreover, federal regulation has 
served as a model in this area, and thus has not infringed upon 
extant statutory schemes: The bulk of these statutes are fash-
ioned after section 102 of the Uniform Securities Act, whose 
language in tum is taken from sections 206(1) and (2) of the 
Advisers Act.105 Thus, because the implication of a federal cause of 
action would not conflict with long-established state laws or state 
interests, this factor does not counsel against judicial implication of a 
damage action. 
99. See text at note 34 supra. 
100. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4775. 
101. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4778. 
102. See, e.g., SEC, Report of the Advisory Comm. on Investment Management 
Services for Individual Investors, Jan. 18, 1973, at 63; Note, supra note 70, at 834. 
103. ALAS. STAT. § 45.55.020 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1236 (1966); CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 25235 (West Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-338(b) 
(1969); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 485-25(b) (1968); IDAHO CODE§ 30-1404 (1967); ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 21 1/2, § 137.121 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. CODE§ 
23-2-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1253(b) (1974); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 292.320 (1972); Mo. CoRP. & AssN. CODE ANN. § 11-302 (1975); MICH. 
CoMP. LAws § 451.502 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 80A.02 (Supp. 1975); Mo. REV. 
STAT. § 409.102 (1969); MONT. REv. CooES ANN. § 15-2005(2) (1967); NED. REV. 
STAT. § 8-1102(2) (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-53 (1970); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 48-18-29B (1966); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.42 (Page 1964); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 102 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-404 (Supp. 1975); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 62-202 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-2 (1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 
13.1-503 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.020 (1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.44 
(1975); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 17-117.2 (1965). 
104. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.42 (Page 1964). 
105. UNIFORM SECURITIES Acr § 102, Comment .01. 
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II. THE ScOPE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION 
As one commentator has stated with regard to private causes of 
action under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act: "It does 
not follow [from the implication of a cause of action] that every 
minor infraction of the proxy rules-such as mailing to the Commis-
sion only three rather than four copies of the annual report-will 
automatically invalidate the proxies."100 Nor need it follow from the 
implication of a cause of action under section 206 that all violations 
of that section will subject advisers to private damage liability. In 
exercising their discretion, federal courts should tailor the cause of 
action under section 206 to effectuate the principal purpose of the 
Advisers Act-the preservation of the fiduciary relationship between 
advisers and investors. 
This section proposes a scope for damage actions under section 
206; first, it outlines the substantive content of section 206 as inter-
preted by the SEC and enforced by the courts, and then, in light of 
the purpose of the Act, delineates the damage action by defining 
classes of plaintiffs and defendants, and establishing standards of 
causation and scienter. 
A. Substantive Content of Section 206 
The SEC has broad definitional and rulemaking powers under 
section 206 and has used those powers to describe practices it consid-
ers "fraudulent," "manipulative," or "deceptive" within the meaning 
of that section. Because of the SEC's familiarity with the problems 
of investors and the practices of advisers, federal courts should give 
weight to these substantive interpretations. However, because the 
adverse consequences to the advisory industry of subjecting invest-
ment advisers to damage liability may be far greater than the adverse 
consequences of subjecting them to agency disciplinary proceed-
ings, 107 courts should reject SEC interpretations where appropriate to 
further legislative intent. 
For convenience, the SEC interpretations discussed here are di-
vided into three groups: conduct involving misrepresentation or non-
disclosure, conduct not involving misrepresentation or nondisclosure 
that is nevertheless fraudulent or deceptive, and conduct involving 
adviser/client fee arrangements (which may or may not fit into either 
of the other categories). 
1. Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure 
Adviser advertising is one area in which the SEC has frequently 
106. 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 943. 
107. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 n.40 
(1963). 
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found nondisclosure or misrepresentation. Rule 206( 4)-1 108 prohib-
its an investment adviser from including in advertising material (1) 
testimonials by former clients, (2) past specific recommendations 
made by the adviser unless the advertisement offers to supply the 
potential client with a list of all recent recommendations, (3) graphs, 
charts, or other formulae that purportedly aid the client in making 
investment decisions unless the advertisement "prominently discloses" 
the limitations and difficulties of using such formulae, (4) any offer 
of "free" services to clients unless the services are indeed free, and 
(5) any statements that are false or misleading.100 
The SEC has also determined that section 206 is violated by 
misrepresentations and nondisclosure in advisory publications and 
direct statements to clients. 110 In particular, the SEC has found 
violations of section 206 in the publication of misleading statements 
about the background and experience of the adviser111or the corpo-
rations in which the adviser has urged his clients to invest,112 in the 
making of false and deceptive statements to clients about the price at 
which they could purchase certain stock, 113 and in the failure to 
disclose to clients to whom notices of the assignment of their advisory 
contracts were sent that the contracts could not be assigned without 
their consent.114 
Finally, the Commission has found nondisclosure or misrepresen-
tation violative of section 206 in the area of adviser conflicts of 
interest. Under section 206(3), any adviser acting as a principal for 
his own account (or acting as a broker for another client's account) 
108. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (1975). 
109. For applications of the rule see, for example, Killgore Management, Inc., 
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 78,977 (SEC Aug. 25, 1972) 
(rule violated by advertisement failing to disclose that securities listed in sample 
portfolio were arbitrarily selected and showed fortuitous profits and losses); Shortline 
Reports, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 77,962 (SEC 
Feb. 22, 1971) (false, misleading, deceptive, flamboyant, and excessively dramatic 
newspaper advertisements); Axe Securities Corp., 42 S.E.C. 381 (1964) (violation 
where not disclosed that adviser paid for article appearing in book distributed to 
prospective brides that described adviser as "outstanding" and "nationally recog-
nized"). 
110. There is as yet no rule under section 206 dealing specifically with misrepre-
sentations or omissions made by advisers directly to their clients. A proposed rule 
206(4)-3 dealing with "investment advisory communications," set out in Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 231 (Oct. 10, 1968), [1967-1968 Transfer Binder] CCH 
FED. SEc. L. REP. 1177,612, was not adopted by the SEC. See generally Comment, 
SEC Regulation of Investment Advisers, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 1230 (urging adoption of 
the proposed rule). 
111. See Paul K. Peers, Inc., 42 S.E.C. 539 (1965). 
112. See Paul K. Peers, Inc., 42 ·s.E.C. 539 (1965); Bridwell & Co., [1964-
1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 77,183 (SEC Dec. 18, 1964). 
113. See Patrick Clements, 42 S.E.C. 373 (1964). 
114. See Bridwell & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED, SEc. L. REP. 
1177,183 (SEC Dec. 18, 1964). 
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who sells or purchases a security to or from a client must disclose 
his interest and obtain the client's consent before effecting the trans-
action.115 The SEC has maintained: 
The disclosure should include, as a minimum, (a) the capacity in 
which the investment adviser proposes to act, (b) the cost to the ad-
viser of any security which he proposes to sell to his client (or, if 
he proposes to buy a security from his client and knows or is ·reason-
ably certain of the price at which it is to be resold, a statement of 
that price), and (c) the best price at which the transaction could be 
effected by or for the client elsewhere if such price is more advan-
tageous to the client than the actual purchase or sale price. More-
over, any disclosure of the cost to the investment adviser (or the price 
he expects to receive on resale) should be so phrased that its full im-
port is obvious to the client.116 
Section 206(3) is principally aimed at adviser "scalping"-that 
is, purchasing stock prior to recommending it to clients and then 
selling it after the market has shifted due to the adviser's recommen-
dations. In 1963, in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,117 
the Supreme Court held that the SEC could obtain an injunction 
requiring advisers to make full disclosure of the practice to clients. On 
the basis of the legislative history of the Investment Advisers Act, the 
Court concluded that the Act "reflect[ed] a congressional recognition 
'of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory 
relationship.' "118 Although the Court refused to conclude that sec-
tion 206 prohibits all trading by an investment adviser in securities in 
which his clients have an interest, 119 the SEC has used the Court's 
reasoning to revoke the registration of an adviser who engaged in 
"scalping" at a loss: "Even though the shares were sold at a loss, the 
recommendation by [the investment adviser] of a stock in which [its 
president] was trading without revealing his personal interest in that 
stock constitutes fraudulent conduct."120 
2. Fraudulent and Deceptive Practices 
While emphasizing nondisclosure and misrepresentation, the SEC 
has decided that certain adviser practices are prima facie violations of 
section 206 notwithstanding full disclosure to clients. In this cate-
gory are various arrangements between investment advisers and 
broker-dealers: ( 1) the interpositioning, by an adviser, of a broker-
dealer between a mutual fund and a second broker-dealer who actually 
115. For the text of this provision, see note 13 supra. 
116. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 40 (Jan. 5, 1945), 4 CCH F.ED. SEC. L. 
REP. ,r 56,375, at 44,104. 
117. 375U.S.180 (1963). 
118. 375 U.S. at 191, quoting 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1412. 
119. 375 U.S. at 196. 
120. Patrick Clements, 42 S.E.C. 373, 379 (1964). 
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effects the fund's transactions, 121 (2) an arrangement between a 
broker-dealer and an investment adviser whereby the adviser 
"recapture[s]" part of the commission paid by the adviser's clients to 
the broker-dealer,122 (3) an arrangement whereby a broker-dealer 
receives part of the fee paid by a client to his investment adviser in 
return for recommending the adviser to the client and performing 
certain services for the adviser,123 and (4) an arrangement whereby 
an investment adviser directs individual portfolios that he manages to 
a broker-dealer in return for credit against subscription or equipment 
expenses.124. 
The SEC has also ruled that certain adviser/ client agreements are 
prima facie violations of section 206. One ruling involved a "Memo-
randum of Agreement" sent by the advisor to each of her clients. The 
memorandum stated that the adviser would act as principal in all 
transactions involving her clients' accounts unless otherwise agreed. 
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the SEC's revocation of 
the adviser's registration in this instance notwithstanding an amicus 
brief, urging reversal, filed by 120 of the adviser's 175 clients.12G In 
another ruling, 120 the SEC concluded that section 206 would ,be vio-
lated by an "earnest money" agreement entered into between an ad-
viser and a prospective client whereby the adviser would credit the 
prospective client's deposit against future adviser's fees but keep the 
deposit if no advisory contract were ultimately signed. 
The list of prima facie violations of section 206 also includes most 
adviser dealings in client funds. Rule 206(4)-2127 prohibits any 
adviser "who has custody or possession of any funds or securities in 
which any client has any beneficial interest" from taking any action 
with respect to those funds or securities unless (1) the securities are 
segregated, identified, and kept in a reasonably secure place, (2) the 
121. Delaware Management Co., 43 S.E.C. 392 (1967). 
122. Provident Management Corp., 44 S.E.C. 442 (1970). The SEC found this 
practice to be violative of section 206 despite the fact that no injury to the adviser's 
client had been shown: "While there is no proof that Fund [client] did not receive 
the best execution on its transactions, or that the existence of the arrangements 
described resulted in additional costs to Fund, once the reciprocal arrangements were 
made, it was improper for [the adviser] to keep for itself rather than confer on Fund 
the benefits attributable to Fund's assets." 44 S.E.C. at 447. 
123. Reinholdt & Gardner, SEC no-action letter, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] 
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 78,120 (March 25, 1971 ). 
124. Donnelly, Clark, Chase & Haakh, SEC no-action letter, (1973 Transfer 
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 78,120 (March 27, 1973). The letter did suggest 
that the arrangement might be condoned if the full benefit of the adviser's reduction 
in expenses was passed on to the clients. (1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. 
REP. at 83,098. 
125. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
126. James L. Nollkamper, SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] 
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 78,664 (Dec. 21, 1971 ). 
127. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (1975). 
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funds are kept in a separate bank account maintained in the adviser's 
name as trustee and the adviser keeps separate records of each 
account, (3) the adviser gives written notice to his clients as to where 
the funds or securities are kept, (4) the adviser sends an itemized 
record of such funds or securities to each client at least once every 
three months, and (5) all funds are verified at least once each year by 
an independent public accountant, without prior notice to the adviser, 
and a copy of the accountant's certificate is filed with the SEC. 
3. Fee Arrangements 
The SEC has proscribed under section 206 certain adviser/ client 
fee arrangements. In this area, the Commission has relied principally 
on findings of nondisclosure and misrepresentation but has suggested 
as well that, with regard to unsophisticated or naive investors, no 
amount of disclosure will suffice.128 In the case of fees charged for 
advisory services, the SEC has determined that any adviser desiring to 
charge more than "the normal fee charged by the advisory industry" 
must "disclose to existing and potential clients not only that its fee is 
higher than normal, but the extent to which its fee is higher than 
normal."129 Generalizing, the Commission has stated: 
[W]hether or not a particular act, practice or course of business 
would operate as a fraud on a client is a question of act [sic]. Ac-
cordingly, whether or not the Adviser's disclosure with respect to fees 
would be adequate in a particular case would depend on the totality 
of the circumstances in which such disclosure is made including the 
manner in which it is made, and the sophistication of the particular 
client.130 
Two statutory provisions in the investment area that expressly 
regulate compensation agreements shed light on the content of sec-
tion 206. Section 205 of the Investment Advisers Act prohibits regis-
tered investment advisers from entering into or performing under an 
investment advisory contract that, inter alia, "provides for compensa-
tion to the investment adviser on the basis of a share of capital gains 
upon or capital appreciation of the funds or any portion of the funds 
of the client. "m This section is inapplicable to advisers exempt from 
registration under the Act, to advisory contracts between an adviser 
128. See Roman S. Gorski, [1967-1968 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 
,r 77,514, at 83,053 (SEC Dec. 22, 1967) (dictum). 
129. Rotan Mosle, Inc., SEC no-action letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH 
FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 79,961, at 84,476 (July 24, 1974) (emphasis original). Accord, 
Commodity Management Serv. Corp., SEC no-action letter, [1973-1974 Transfer 
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1f 79,805, at 84,184 (April 19, 1974). 
130. Rotan Mosle, Inc., SEC no-action letter, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH 
FED. SEC. L. REP.1f 79,961 (July 24, 1974). See generally Comment, supra note 86, 
at 146. 
131. 15 U.S.C. § S0b-5(1) (1970). 
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and an investment company registered under the Investment Compa-
ny Act, and to contracts "relat[ing] to the investment of assets in 
excess of $1 million."132 According to Professor Loss,1 33 section 205 
"merges" with section 206 so that conduct violative of section 205 is 
"fraudulent" and "deceptive" within the meaning of section 206. 
Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act,134 added in 
1970, provides an express cause of action in favor of clients of 
investment company advisers who "breach [their] fiduciary duty" in 
the setting of advisory fees. Presumably, conduct proscribed by 
section 36(b) also would be actionable under section 206. The 
cause of action set forth in section 36(b), however, is circumscribed 
in some very important respects: Suit may be brought only against the 
investment adviser, recovery may not be had for damages sustained 
more than one year before the institution of the action, and damages 
are limited to the amount of compensation received by the adviser.131i 
To assure that these congressionally imposed limitations on the sec-
tion 36 (b) cause of action are not circumvented, courts could exclude 
excessive fee arrangements from the reach of section 206, or they 
could apply the section 36(b) limitations to all suits under section 
206 involving adviser fees. A third and more appropriate alternative, 
however, would be to apply the section 36(b) limitations only to suits 
under section 206 brought against advisers who are also within the 
reach of the Investment Company Act. The first alternative is unne-
cessarily cautious. While dealing with all advisers uniformly, the 
second alternative is less attractive than the third because it fails to 
maximize client recovery of legitimate damages and because it applies 
limitations on the cause of action outside of the narrow context in 
which those limitations were considered by Congress. 
4. The Rationale: Adviser as Fiduciary 
Underlying these SEC applications of section 206 is the idea that 
investment advisers are fiduciaries and as such are charged with the 
obligations and responsibilities of dealing in utmost good faith. 1311 
This viewpoint, supported by the Act's legislative history and by the 
132. 15 U.S.C. § S0b-5 (1970). 
133. 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1412. 
134. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970). 
135. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3) (1970). 
136. The SEC has characterized an investment adviser as "a fiduciary who is 
prohibited from engaging in any activity in conflict with the interest of his clients." 
Ernest Hack, SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. 
REP. 1f 78,426, at 80,936 (Sept. 9, 1971). Thus, conduct that puts the investment 
adviser "in a position wherein his personal interests might govern any action taken for 
his clients," is seen as violating section 206. Donnelly, Clark, Chase & Haakh, SEC 
no-action letter, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 79,377, at 83,098 
(March 27, 1973). 
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Supreme Court's decision in Capital Gains, should be adopted by 
courts in constructing a section 206 private cause of action. 
The focus on the fiduciary nature of the adviser/ client relation-
ship differentiates section 206 from, for example, rule lOb-5, which is 
aimed at eliminating nondisclosure and misrepresentation rather than 
at preserving a fiduciary relationship. While full disclosure of a 
transaction usually absolves individuals of lOb-5 liability,137 a suffi-
ciently unfair transaction should give rise to section 206 liability not-
withstanding the disclosure, so long as the requisite causation is 
established. One decision in which the court failed to notice this 
significant difference between section 206 and rule l0b-5 is Jones 
Memorial Trust v. Tsai Investment Services, Inc.138 There, plaintiffs 
alleged that mismanagement by an investment adviser of the "process 
of research and recommending investment transactions" violated both 
provisions. Lumping the provisions together, the court concluded 
that, since the alleged mismanagement was fully disclosed, neither 
provision was violated.139 This result seems improper if the section 
206 private cause of action is to protect the fiduciary nature of the 
adviser/ client relationship and proscribe substantive as well as proce-
dural unfairness. 
B. The Plaintiff Class 
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Cort v. Ash, it is clear 
that the question of who can sue under section 206 is answered by 
applying the traditional test for standing and by discerning from the 
substance and legislative history of the Advisers Act the intended 
beneficiaries of section 206. These two inquiries overlap (the stand-
ing determination whether a prospective plaintiff is within a statute's 
zone of interest is subsumed in the determination whether he is within 
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted) and thus 
· merge into a twofold test: has the plaintiff suffered injury in fact, 
and does he satisfy the Ash "especial benefit" test. Since the first 
half of the test is basically a question of fact, the determination of 
who can sue under section 206 turns on the· sec.and half of the test. 
This section isolates the class for whose especial benefit the Advisers 
Act in general and section 206 in particular were enacted. 
Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act make it unlawful 
for an investment adviser to engage in any act ,that operates as a fraud 
upon any client or prospective client. Section 206(3) speaks of the 
relationship between the adviser and client. Section 206( 4), on the 
other hand, omits the client/prospective client language and makes 
137. See Note, The Controlling bzfluence Standard in Rule J0b-5 Corporate 
Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1007, 1040-43 (1973). 
138. 367 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
139. 367 F. Supp. at 497. 
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unlawful all fraudulent conduct, as that term is defined by the SEC. 
The specific language in sections 206(1), (2), and (3) suggests that 
clients and, in some cases, "prospective clients"140 of advisers are the 
intended beneficiaries of section 206 and should be able to bring 
private damage suits under that section. The question remains, 
however, whether any person who suffers financial injury as a result 
of an adviser's violation of section 206 should have access to the 
section 206 cause of action. 
Limitation of the section 206 cause of action to clients or prospec-
tive clients of investment advisers would exclude from recovery a 
potentially large class of individuals injured by violations of the 
section. This class would include persons who were essentially "tip-
pees" of the adviser's clients-that is, persons who received and relied 
on to their detriment incomplete or inaccurate information promul-
gated by an adviser and relayed by one of the adviser's clients. The 
class would also include members of the public at large who, for 
example, while not themselves "subscribers," read an advisory publi-
cation containing false information and suffered subsequent economic 
loss in reliance upon that information.141 If the primary function of 
section 206 private causes of action is either the deterrence of all 
fraudulent conduct by advisers or the compensation of all losses 
flowing from violations of section 206, then it seems desirable to 
extend the action to these potential plaintiffs. If the purpose behind 
constructing a private cause of action is viewed more restrictively, 
however, as preserving and protecting a specialized relationship of 
•trust between adviser and client, then the exclusion of nonclients from 
suit under section 206 seems appropriate. 
There are several reasons for a court to adopt the more restrictive 
stance in determining the plaintiff class for section 206 actions. As 
noted above, 142 the SEC has characterized investment advisers as 
fiduciaries and has defined the scope of their obligations under 
section 206 in terms of "fiduciary duties." The principle that accords 
substantial weight to the interpretation of a statute by the department 
entrusted with its administration143 therefore counsels courts to limit 
140. The meaning of the term "prospective client" is discussed in the text at and 
following note 156 infra. 
141. It is difficult to think of a violation of section 206 not involving misreprcsen• 
tation or fraudulent omission for which a nonclient could maintain an action under 
that provision, assuming that courts demand some showing that the adviser's violation 
caused plaintif rs injury. 
142. See note 136 supra and accompanying text. 
143. "[I]t has long been established that the question of the inclusion of a 
particular person or entity within the coverage of a regulatory statute is generally for 
initial determination by an agency, subject to review on direct appeal, rather than for 
a district court .... " SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1375 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970). But cf. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 
286 (1971) (principle inapplicable when agency regulations conflict with statute). 
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the scope of the adviser's liability to those persons to whom fiduciary 
duties are owed. Injury ,to persons other than clients and prospective 
clients, while perhaps forseeable from the point of view of the decep-
tive investment adviser, cannot be said to flow from the breach of a 
fiduciary duty owed to the injured nonclients without expanding the 
fiduciary concept beyond recognition. 
The focus of the legislative history of the Advisers Act on preser-
vation of the fiduciary relationship also supports limiting the class of 
plaintiffs in section 206 actions. Although the history contains refer-
ences to the protection of "investors"144 and the "public,"145 it is 
apparent from the context of those references, and from an examina-
tion of the kinds of adviser activities prevalent before 1940 that 
Congress sought to eliminate, 146 that Congress intended to protect 
only those investors and members of the public who had consulted 
investment advisers. 
Also instructive is that, in enacting the Advisers Act, Congress 
desired to avoid overregulating the advisory industry.147 In its view, 
the increasing technicalities of the marketplace created a need for 
advisers possessing a level of knowledge and expertise well beyond 
that of the ordinary investor. Excessive regulation, it feared, would 
discourage qualified individuals from entering the field-a conse-
quence more undesirable than leaving certain activities unregulated. 
Limiting the plaintiff class to clients and prospective clients is a 
reasonable means of accommodating this congressional desire. 
Implicit support for this limitation on the plaintiff class underlies 
the Third Circuit's decision in Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc.148 
There, plaintiff shareholders of certain mutual funds brought suit 
against, inter alia, allegedly malfeasant investment advisers to a large 
group of mutual_ funds, under various securities acts including the 
Investment Advisers Aot. The court held that plaintiffs could bring 
suit only against advisers of the funds in which the plaintiffs held 
stock and were limited to bringing derivative actions on behalf of 
those funds rather than direct aotions. In the investment company 
setting, the adviser's client is the company rather than its sharehold-
ers. In limiting the action in the investment company context to 
bona fide shareholders bringing derivative actions, the court assured 
that only the adviser's client would recover. 
Finally, support for limiting the plaintiff class is provided by the 
two policy considerations set forth by the Supreme Court last term in 
144. See S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 64, at 21, quoted in the text at note 73 
supra. 
145. See H.R. REP. No. 2639, supra note 73, at 28, quoted in note 73 supra. 
146. See note 6 supra. 
147. See note 69 supra and text at notes 69-70 supra. 
148. 434 F.2d 727 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). 
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Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,149 in which the Court 
upheld the viability of the purchaser/seller requirement1:;o in private 
suits under rule lOb-5. The Court noted that the elimination of the 
purchaser/seller requirement "would throw open to the trier of fact 
many rather hazy issues of historical fact the proof of which depended 
almost entirely on oral testimony."m The determination whether a 
plaintiff would have purchased or sold securities but for the rule 1 Ob-
5 violation would be based in many instances on merely the uncorro-
borated oral evidence of the plaintiff: 
The jury would not even have the benefit of weighing the plaintiff's 
version against the defendant's version, since the elements to which 
the plaintiff would testify would be in many cases totally unknown 
and unknowable to the defendant. The very real risk in permitting 
those in respondent's position to sue under Rule lOb-5 is that the door 
will be open to recovery of substantial damages on the part of one 
who offers only his own testimony to prove that he ever consulted 
a prospectus of the issuer, that he paid any attention to it, or that 
the representations contained in it damaged him. . . . In the ab-
sence of the [purchaser/seller requirement], bystanders to the securi-
ties marketing process could await developments on the sidelines 
without risk, claiming that inaccuracies in disclosure caused nonselling 
in a falling market and that unduly pessimistic predictions by the is-
suer followed by a rising market caused them to allow retrospectively 
golden opportunities to pass.162 
The purchaser/seller requirement viewed in this light thus serves as a 
rule of corroboration. The Court also emphasized that the effective 
elimination of the purchaser/seller requirement would create a grave 
potential for nuisance or "strike" suits and for misuse of the discovery 
procedure.153 Without such a requirement, virtually any plaintiff 
could make a colorable allegation of injury sufficient to withstand 
motions for dismissal or summary judgment since the inquiry in each 
case would involve delicate factual questions not subject to summary 
disposition. The resulting prospect of extensive discovery of business 
documents and the deposition of officers and associates, the disrup-
tive effect of which would be costly to the defendant organization, 
would thus accord essentially groundless suits a substantial settlement 
value. 
These considerations apply with equal force in the context of 
section 206 and encourage courts to employ a fairly rigid client/po-
tential-client requirement. The trier of fact, in determining whether 
a nonclient plaintiff relied upon and was injured by an adviser's 
149. 43 U.S.L.W. 4707 (June 9, 1975). 
150. For further discussion of the purchaser/seller requirement in the context of 
both rule l0b-5 and section 206, see text at and following notes 159-61 infra. 
151. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4713. 
152. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4714. 
153. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4712-13. 
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fraudulent activities, would in most cases be forced to rely totally 
upon uncorroborated oral testimony, as in the l0b-5 context. More-
over, the absence of a client/potential-client requirement would 
present an unreasonable prospect of vexatious "strike" suits and of 
misuse of the discovery process. 
If courts limit the class of section 206 plaintiffs to clients and 
prospective clients of investment advisers, they must determine what 
persons those categories encompass. Few problems arise in deter-
mining who is a client: once an advisory contract is entered into, 154 or 
an advisory fee is paid,155 the relationship is clear. Problems do 
arise, however, in defining "prospective clients." The SEC has never 
adequately defined the term, although it has employed the "prospec-
tive clients" language of sections 206(1) and (2) for the purpose of 
taking administrative action against an adviser. The SEC concluded 
in Ralph Howard Seipel, 156 the only action in which the term has had 
much significance, that "prospective clients" included persons actu-
ally solicited by the adviser for the purpose of making them clients. 
While that case involved direct telephone communications with per-
sons answering the adviser's newspaper advertisements, the SEC's 
reasoning might equally have been applied to persons who had merely 
read the advertisements. 
If effective restrictions are not placed on the definition of "pros-
pective clients," any attempt to narrow the scope of the plaintiff class 
will be frustrated. Without restrictions, persons could maintain that 
they were "prospective clients" by merely reciting ·that they had 
intended to become clients of the adviser at some future date.. It 
would be more in accordance with the legislative history of the 
Adviser's Act, and with the Supreme Court's rationale in Blue Chip 
Stamps, for courts to use the "prospective client" language to refer 
only to the time at which the section 206 violation occurred, not to 
plaintiffs status when the suit is brought. Under this interpretation, 
only clients could bring section 206 actions but they could recover for 
injury suffered as a result of adviser malfeasance that occurred while 
they were prospective clients. For example, if an adviser makes 
154. The advisory contract need not be denominated as such. In Bolger v. 
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the 
"investment advisers" were the general partners of a limited partnership, and the 
"clients" of those advisers were the limited partners. In this situation, the partnership 
agreement would function as an "advisory contract" for the purposes of determining 
who the adviser's clients are. 
155. If there is no fee paid for advisory services, there is good reason to conclude 
that the profferor of those services is not an "investment adviser'' within the meaning 
of section 206 and hence should not be amenable to suit under that section. For a 
discussion of the class of possible defendants in section 206 private actions, see text at 
notes 166-85 infra. 
156. 38 S.E.C. 256 (1958). In revoking the adviser's registration in this case for 
fraudulent and deceptive solicition of clients, the Commission stated that it was 
"immaterial" that the adviser had no clients at the time the misconduct took place. 
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material misstatements to a nonclient about the value of certain 
securities and if that nonclient subsequently becomes a client and 
suffers losses as a result of investing in (or failing to invest in) those 
securities, the client should be able to recover notwithstanding that 
the violations of section 206 occurred prior to establishment of the 
adviser/ client relationship. In cases involving section 206 violations 
that occurred when the plaintiff was a "prospective client," courts 
should strictly enforce materiality and causation requirements: If 
these requirements are not adhered to, then an adviser who, for 
example, violates the advertising rule157 by including a former client's 
testimonial will be subject to damage liability to all persons who read 
the advertisement, became clients, and subsequently suffered losses 
due to the adviser's advice. Such expanded liability would certainly 
have a deleterious effect on the advisory industry, a result inconsistent 
with legislative intent. 
Regardless of the scope of the plaintiff class in section 206 
actions, it is necessary to determine the propriety of imposing addi-
tional requirements for bringing the action, akin to the "purchaser/ 
seller" requirement for suits under rule lOb-5. Although there is no 
language in section 206 explicitly imposing such a limitation, a court 
could read these restrictions into section 206 by relying upon the 
reference to "investors" found in the legislative history of the Ad-
visers Act. 158 
The "purchase or sale" of securities requirement in 1 0b-5 actions, 
first articulated by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel 
Corp.159 and recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip 
Stamps, has been viewed as effectuating a congressional intent to 
preclude federal courts from "inquir[ing] into every decision affect-
ing the management of corporations and then fashion[ing] a new 
federal law superseding state law on the fiduciary responsibilities of 
corporate directors, officers, and controlling persons."160 According 
to Professor Bromberg, "The requirement also serves a causation 
purpose, to assure that plaintiff has a real, rather than hypothetical 
injury."161 Recovery in the section 206 context could be limited to 
losses from buying or selling securities as a result of adviser malfeas-
ance, thereby facilitating damage computation, reducing the prospect 
that courts would have before them only plaintiff's uncorroborated 
oral evidence, minimizing plaintiff recovery for conjectural injuries, 
and reducing the possibility of "strike" suits. . 
A requirement of this type would disallow recovery by a client 
151. See text at notes 108-09 supra. 
158. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 64, at 21. 
159. 193 F.2d 641, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). 
160. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 809 (5th Cir. 1970). 
161. 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 4.7(567) at 88.9-.10. 
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who had purchased securities prior to consulting the adviser and had 
retained those securities to his detriment on the basis of the adviser's 
deceptive or fraudulent representations. Recovery would similarly be 
denied to a client who decided not to buy a certain security on the 
basis of adviser malfeasance. The injury of the client in such in-
stances, however, flows from a breach of the adviser/ client fiduciary 
relationship and logically should be redressed to protect that relation-
ship adequately. It would seem appropriate, then, in light of the 
purpose of the Act, to allow recovery if competing interests can 
reasonably be accommodated. 
One method of according these interests sufficient weight while 
allowing recovery where it is needed most is to impose the proposed 
client/potential-client limitation and a proof of causation requirement 
(discussed below1112). If these two restrictions on recovery are ap-
plied, damage calculations will in most instances not be difficult: 
Courts can allow damages that will put the client in the position he 
would have been in had he not followed the adviser's recommenda-
tion. Moreover, courts will not be forced to decide delicate factual 
questions on the basis of plaintiffs uncorroborated oral evidence since 
advisers will have knowledge of the advice rendered, of ,the date it 
was rendered, of the strength of the advice, and, in many circum-
stances, of plaintiffs disposition to follow such advice. To be sure, 
difficult problems arise in determining whether the adviser's state-
ments actually injured the client. But courts will have considerably 
more information on which to base the decision than in the rule 1 0b-
5 context considered in Blue Chip Stamps. This information avail-
able to determine the legitimacy of plaintiffs allegations of injury will 
also reduce the possibility of plaintiff recovery for conjectural injuries 
and the feasibility of "strike suits." Neither, of course, will be 
entirely eliminated, but the possibility of both exists in many types of 
litigation and should not in this context be considered overriding. 
Imposition of client/potential-client and causation requirements 
should sufficiently reduce the possibility of either to allow courts to 
imply a section 206 cause of action without imposing a "purchase or 
sale" type of requirement. 
Finally, support for the implication of a section 206 cause of 
action without the imposition of a purchaser/ seller requirement can 
be found in Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath.163 
There the court granted a motion to dismiss the rule l0b-5 claim 
because the "sale" did not occur "in connection with" the fraudulent 
conduct, 164 but it did not dismiss the companion section 206 claim. 
The court discussed the purchaser/seller requirement only in the 
162. See text at notes 186-92 infra. 
163. 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
164. 381 F. Supp. at 267. 
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context of the l0b-5 claim;165 it apparently did not think the require-
ment was applicable to section 206. 
C. The Defendant Class 
Section 206 of the Advisers Act regulates the activities of "invest-
ment advisers" rather than, like rule l0b-5, the activities of any 
person. The section applies to all "investment advisers" as defined in 
section 202(a)(l l), 166 including those who are exempt from regis-
tration with the SEC under section 203(b).167 
Section 202(a)(l 1) provides: 
"Investment Adviser" means any person who, for compensation, en-
gages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities . . . or who, for 
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates 
analyses or reports concerning securities; but does not include (A) 
a bank, or any bank holding company . . . which is not an invest-
ment company; (B) any lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher 
whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the practice 
of his profession; (C) any broker or dealer whose performance of 
such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a 
broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor; 
(D) the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or 
business or financial publication of general and regular circulation; 
(E) any person whose advice, analyses, or reports relate to no securi-
ties other than securities which are direct obligations of or obligations 
guaranteed as to principal or interest by the United States . . . ; or 
(F) such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as 
the Commission may designate by rules and regulations or order.168 
While detailed, this definition is subject to conflicting interpretations. 
It is therefore appropriate to consider whether the principal purpose 
of section 206 justifies a broad construction. The exceptions listed in 
section 202(a)(l 1) basically exclude persons who give investment 
advice incidentally in the course of rendering other professional serv-
ices. Section 202(a)(l 1) literally seems to encompass, therefore, all 
persons or entities on whom it is justifiable to impose fiduciary 
obligations with respect to the dispensing of investment advice.100 A 
165. 381 F. Supp. at 265-67. 
166. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll) (1970). 
167. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (1970). This section exempts from registration ad-
visers who do only "local" business and who do not deal in securities listed on na-
tional exchanges, advisers whose only clients are insurance companies, and advisers 
who have had fewer than 15 clients over the course of the past year and who neither 
hold themselves out as advisers to the general public, nor act as advisers to invest-
ment companies. 
168. The author's research unearthed no decisions in which an alleged violator 
has challenged the SEC's enforcement of section 206 by claiming that he is not an 
"investment adviser." 
169. "Section 202(a)(l 1) of the [Investment Advisers] Act lists a number of 
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broader construction could expose to liability advisers not fairly en-
gaged in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff, and/ or those not 
engaged in rendering investment advice who aid or abet or otherwise 
participate with a bona fide adviser in a violation of section 206. 
Section 202(a)(ll) gives the SEC the power to determine who 
falls within the "intent" of that provision, a power used in numerous 
advisory letters over the years attempting to explicate which persons 
or entities fall within the definition of "investment adviser."170 The 
SEC decisions suggest that, in general, if the services being offered 
"can be used to determine the value of securities and the advisability 
of investing in, purchasing or selling securities,"171 and are being 
offered for a fee to the general public, then the person rendering those 
services is an "investment adviser" within the intent of the Advisers 
Act regardless whether the services contain a value judgment with 
regard to the analyzed securities.172 On the other hand, where the 
advice is given exclusively to members of the adviser's family or to 
close personal friends, even if a fee is charged, the adviser is not an 
"investment adviser" within the intent of section 202.173 
Thus, in delineating the class of "investment advisers," the SEC 
has focused on the business aspects of the adviser's services and 
attempted to separate those advisers who, by representing themselves 
examples of persons or entities whose activities might fall within the broad definition 
of 'investment adviser' but whose customary practices would not place them in the 
special, otherwise unregulated, fiduciary role for which the law established standards." 
SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 
U.S. 958 (1970). See generally 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 1396-401; Loomis, supra 
note 7, at 246 ("Since there are a multitude of persons who have and express ideas or 
factual data about the stock market and many hope to derive some return from suQb. 
expressions, the scope of the basic definition turns largely upon the phrases 'engaging 
in the business' or 'as part of a regular business.'" (footnotes omitted)). 
170. The Commission has advised that the following are all "investment advis-
ers": a corporation offering a computer analysis of investment performance· to broker-
dealers, Investment Decisions, Inc., SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer 
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 78,330 (June 23, 1971); a corporation that 
intended to publish a newsletter evaluating the performance of certain investment 
advisers, Schield Stock Serv., Inc., SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] 
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.1[ 78,649 (Jan. 26, 1972); and a company that, for a $10 fee, 
would "trace the history of a company that has become somewhat obscure through 
conversion of its stock, merger, liquidation, or some other reason, for the purpose of 
determining whether the stock of that company has any value.'' Securities Research 
Corp., SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 
78,790 (April 7, 1972). 
171. Investment Decisions, Inc., SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer 
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 78,330 (June 23, 1971). 
172. See, e.g., Securities Research Corp., SEC no-action letter, [1971-1972 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.1[ 78,790 (April 7, 1972). 
173. See, e.g., Roosevelt & Son, 29 S.E.C. 879 (1949); Pitcairn Co., 29 S.E.C. 
186 (1949). See also Loran K. Lantz, SEC no-action letter, [1972-1973 Transfer 
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1[ 78,912 (May 11, 1972) (author of one book on 
how to invest in securities would not be in "business" of giving investment advice 
unless book contained formulae for making investment decisions so as to make it 
likely that 1he book would be sold "continuously and indefinitely"). 
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to the public as experts, have incurred fiduciary obligations to their 
clients, from those advisers who, by functioning in a purely personal 
setting, have not. In so doing, the SEC seems accurately to have 
assessed and implemented congressional intent. In so far as the pur-
pose of section 206 is simply to preserve the fiduciary relationship 
where it exists, there is little reason for courts to dispute the SEC's 
presumptively valid interpretation of "investment adviser" and broad-
en or restrict the definition to any significant degree. 174 
The propriety of exposing to section 206 liability those who aid or 
abet or otherwise figure in a violation of that section arose in both 
decisions discussing the implication of a section 206 cause of action. 
Accountant-defendants in Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & 
Horwath allegedly "aided and abetted" a section 206 violation by 
accepting money from the "investment advisers" (general partners) 
of a limited partnership in return for falsifying the partnership's 
financial statements. The court rejected the accountants' contentions 
that section 206 should be read literally: 
[T]he fraudulent activities of the acountant-defendants in this suit 
were inexorably intertwined with the fraud being perpetrated against 
the limited partners by [the partnership's] investment advisors. To 
deny to these investors, who were injured by this combined fraudulent 
conduct, a cause of action against all of the wrongdoers would leave 
the plaintiffs with half a remedy and would run afoul of the Supreme 
Court's repeated admonition that the securities laws are to be con-
strued "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate 
[their] broad remedial purposes".175 
174. In the one case in which the issue whether the defendant was an investment 
adviser was raised, the court rejected the SEC's interpretation. In Selzer v. Bank of 
Bermuda Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the plaintiff, the beneficiary of a 
trust established to invest in American securities, brought suit against the defendant 
bank trustee under, inter alia, sections 206, 214, and 215 of the Advisers Act. 385 F. 
Supp. at 417. The court noted that the SEC had recently ruled that a trustee of an 
investment trust was an adviser within the meaning of the Act, 385 F. Supp. at 420, 
but went on to state: 
A trustee is historically the legal owner of the trust corpus, while the benefi-
ciary is the equitable owner. The trustee does not advise the trust corpus, which 
then takes action pursuant to his advice; rather the trustee acts himself as princi-
pal. While there may be public policy reasons for holding a trustee who deals 
in securities for its trust to the standards of the Investment Advisers Act, neither 
the common sense meaning of the word "adviser" nor a comparison with other 
situations to which the 1940 Act has been held applicable militates in favor of 
doing so. The Court therefore finds that the Investment Advisers Act is not 
available in a suit against a trustee in these circumstances. 
385 F. Supp. at 420. 
What the court in Selzer failed to recognize is that the term "investment adviser" 
should be interpreted not only in the light of common sense, but also in accordance 
with legislative intent. To the extent that a bank solicits business as a trustee by 
holding itself out to the public as competent to make investment decisions it would 
seem squarely to fall within the intent of the definition of investment adviser in the 
Act. 
175. 381 F. Supp. at 268, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. 
375 U.S. 180, 195 (1964). ' 
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The court in Greenspan v. Campos del Toro,176 however, reached the 
opposite conclusion on the ground that, since section 206 "applies 
only to 'investment advisers,' only such persons should be amenable 
to suit."177 
The Bolger court apparently relied at least in part on the amena-
bility to liability of aiders and abettors and co-conspirators under rule 
lOb-5.178 Section 206 and rule lOb-5 are distinguishable, however. 
While "[t]he phrasing of l0b-5, particularly 'any person,' 'scheme 
. . . to defraud' and 'course of business which operates . . . as a 
fraud,' invites inspection of broad spectra of conduct and of all the 
actors in them,''179 section 206 appears to limit the inspection of 
actors in fraudulent schemes to those within the definition of invest-
ment adviser. 
Despite the language differences between these provisions, there 
are valid reasons why courts should expose secondary culpable actors 
to section 206 liability. First, a refusal to allow suit under section 
206 against aiders and abettors or co-conspirators of investment 
advisers would often create incongruous results. For example, sup-
pose an investment adviser and a broker-dealer enter into an arrange-
ment whereby the adviser agrees to direct all of his clients' portfolios 
to the dealer in return for credit against equipment expenses-a 
"prima facie" violation of section 206 according to the SEC.180 Under 
this arrangement, the adviser would profit to the extent of the credit 
received and the broker-dealer would profit to the extent of the 
brokerage fees generated by the accounts referred.181 If the adviser's 
clients are injured by this arrangement, by receiving inadequate or 
biased execution of their accounts, it seems inappropriate to insulate 
from liability the broker-dealer who has profited by the violation 
often more than the adviser. Second, in many situations the culpable 
nonadviser may be the only economically viable source from which 
the plaintiff can recover.182 Third, the nonadviser in many situations 
will be a professional-e.g., accountant, lawyer, or broker-dealer-
176. Civ. No. 73-638 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 1974). 
177. Order of Dismissal at 3. 
178. See 381 F. Supp. at 268. See generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants in 
Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, 
Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 645 (1972). 
179. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 161, § 8.5(515), at 208.4. 
180. Donnelly, Clark, Chase & Haakh, SEC no-action letter, [1973 Transfer 
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.1[ 78,120 (March 27, 1973). 
181. The broker-dealer may profit in other, more subtle, ways by this arrange-
ment. The adviser's clients may recommend the broker-dealer to other persons, or 
may continue using the broker-dealer's services once their relationship with the 
adviser has been terminated. 
182. This was apparently true in Bolger where plaintiffs, limited partners of a 
since-dissolved limited partnership, sought to recover from the accountants that had 
prepared the partnership's financial statements, rather than from the investment 
advisers (general partners) themselves. 
342 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:308 
who, in his own right, owes a duty of "fair dealing" to the public.183 
Finally, it would be unreasonable to deny recovery under section 206 
from aiders and abettors or co-conspirators when such recovery is 
available under rule 1 Ob-5 in situations where there is an actual 
purchase or sale of securities in connection with adviser misrepresen-
tation or nondisclosure. Denying recovery from nonadvisers under 
section 206 while permitting it under rule 1 0b-5 would mean, for 
example, that plaintiffs could recover under rule 1 0b-5 from nonad-
visers in a case like Bolger if the partnership is dissolved "in connec-
tion with" the adviser's fraudulent activities, 184 but could not recover 
under section 206 if the partnership is dissolved (as it was in Bolger) 
after the commission of the fraudulent activities. Certainly, the 
culpability of the ncinadvisers is no greater in the former case than in 
the latter. 
If courts do include secondary culpable parties· in the class of 
persons amenable to suit under section 206, they should insist on a 
showing that these secondary parties had knowledge of the illegal 
actions of the investment adviser. Without such a showing, fiduciary 
obligations of these parties would equal or exceed the obligations 
imposed on advisers themselves under section 206. As has been said 
with regard to the liability of aiders and abettors and co-conspirators 
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts: "Deviation from [the knowledge] 
requirement would unreasonably impose liability on secondary de-
fendants. Adherence to [this] requirement still allows imposition of 
liability in appropriate cases, since knowledge can be shown by 
reckless conduct or through inference."185 
D. Causation and Reliance 
The interplay of several concepts underlies the issue whether an 
adviser's malfeasance caused the client's alleged injury. When the 
malfeasance involves misrepresentation or nondisclosure, causation is 
best thought of in terms of client reliance and the materiality of the 
information misrepresented or not disclosed. When the malfeasance 
is of some other sort, causation becomes more complex and more 
weighty policy factors militate against the imposition of any absolute 
causation requirement. 
In establishing a causation requirement for adviser misrepresenta-
tion or nondisclosure, effective analogy can be made to the rule 1 0b-5 
183. For a discussion of how tort-law theories of liability for breach of a 
professional defendant's obligations to the public might affect his secondary liability 
under rule l0b-5, see Ruder, supra note 178, at 612-18. 
184. This might have occurred if, for example, the general partners/advisers had 
attempted to make the financial situation of the partnership look worse than it really 
was in an effort to have the partnership dissolved in order to take over its accounts 
later on. 
185. Ruder, supra note 178, at 638. 
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context. There courts have eschewed requiring plaintiffs to show 
affirmatively that they relied on the informational error.186 The 
difficulty in proving or disproving reliance, as Professor Bromberg 
has noted, "is likely to produce only a ritual of pleading followed by 'I 
relied' testimony from the plaintiff."187 Instead, courts have focused 
on the issue of materiality-whether information that a reasonable 
investor might have considered important in making investment-
related decisions has been misrepresented or withheld.188 Because of 
the "potential massive liability to hordes of investors who are in fact 
trading on a variety of data, appraisals, and intuitions,"189 a strict 
materiality requirement has been necessary to limit liability.190 
With slight alteration, this approach seems appropriate to apply to 
section 206 actions alleging nondisclosure or misrepresentation. By 
limiting the plaintiff class to clients and the defendant class to bona 
fide advisers, section 206 actions would be restricted to situations 
where reliance by the plaintiff is both reasonable and expected. 
Indeed, it is fair to assume that when a client acts in accordance with 
an adviser's opinion, he does so in reliance upon that opinion. Courts 
thus could presume reliance in all instances of material misrepresenta-
tion and nondisclosure. 191 In light of the congressional desire to 
186. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 
(1972). . 
187. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 161, § 8.6(2), at 210. 
188. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972). 
189. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 161, § 8.3, at 199. 
190. Id. 
191. In Competitive Capital Corp. v. Yamada, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] 
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 94,617 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1974), a private damage action 
brought by a mutual fund and the fund's manager against, inter alia, the same 
accountant-defendants as in the Bolger case and alleging violations of section 17a of 
the 1933 act, section lO(b) of the 1934 act, and section 206 of the Advisers Act for 
the same conduct alleged to be violative of section 206 in Bolger (i.e. the certification 
of false financial statements of Takara, Ltd.), the court granted the accountant-
defendants' motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs failed to show that they had relied 
on the statements prepared by defendants. 
Plaintiffs in Competititive Capital alleged that they had been induced to hire 
defendant Yamada, general partner and "investment adviser" of Takara, Ltd., as a 
fund manager on the basis of information provided by Yamada to plaintiffs describing 
the "success" of the Takara operation. The accountant-defendants, by preparing 
Takara's false financial statements, were alleged to have been involved in the fraud 
that induced plaintiffs' deci~ion. The court found that plaintiffs could not have relied 
on the accountant-defendants' activities, as ,there was evidence that plaintiffs did not 
see Takara's financial statements until four days before they fired Yamada. The 
problem with the court's reasoning in Competitive Capital is that it makes the 
accountant-defendants' liability turn solely on whether plaintiffs relied on a financial 
statement prepared for a totally different purpose. The court should have focused on 
whether the accountant-defendants knew of Yamada's fraudulent scheme to convince 
the Fund to hire him. If knowledge of, and participation in, the scheme to defraud 
the Fund was present, then plaintiffs, who could justifiably be presumed to have relied 
on their relationship with their investment adviser, should have been able to recover 
whether or not they had relied on the statements certified by the accountants. 
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avoid overregulation of the advisory industry, however, it seems 
reasonable to afford defendants an opportunity to prove that reliance 
did not in fact occur or should not reasonably have occurred. The 
requirement of materiality could be applied in a manner similar to the 
rule 1 0b-5 context, tempered, perhaps, by taking into account subjec-
tive factors such as the particular plaintiffs sophistication in the 
securities market.192 This tempering seems appropriate, first, be-
cause the amount of disclosure that satisfies an adviser's fiduciary 
duties should to some degree tum on the client's sophistication, and, 
second, because minor misrepresentations might mislead an unsophis-
ticated client when a more knowledgeable one should not reasonably 
be.misled. 
The causation requirement in the context of section 206 violations 
not involving nondisclosure or misrepresentations should be applied 
both to compensate clients for injuries actually suffered and to pre-
clude defendants from being enriched by their violations. In many 
instances of unlawful adviser/ client or adviser/broker-dealer arrange-
ments, clients will be unable to prove that any specific loss or any 
missed opportunity for gain resulted from the section 206 violations. 
In such instances, courts should allow plaintiffs to recover restitution-
ary damages in the amount of the defendants' enrichment. Where 
advisers receive unlawful payments or credits from broker-dealers, for 
example, clients should have the opportunity to recover the value of 
those payments or credits in lieu of recovering actual damages. One 
problem raised by this approach. is that of allocating these payments 
or credits among the adviser's clients. In other areas, however, such 
as the area of copyright or patent infringement, courts have not 
hesitated to make a rough allocation in determining the amount of 
profits attributable to the infringement and have resolved all reason-
able doubts in favor of the plaintiff. 183 A similar approach toward 
allocation seems appropriate in this context. 
When plaintiff can demonstrate a reasonable causal connection 
between the section 206 violation and actual losses, 184 recovery 
should, of course, be allowed. Recovery of actual damages in ab-
sence of causation, however, seems inappropriate. In Courtland v. 
192. If courts do indeed limit the class of plaintiffs who can sue under section 206 
to clients and limit defendants to "investment advisers," there would be no reason not 
to take these subjective factors into account in determining the materiality of 
defendant's misrepresentation or nondisclosure. This would be more equitable than, 
for instance, using the SEC's "unsophisticated investor" test to determine liability in 
all instances. 
193. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 402-03 
(1939). 
194. In Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court, 
analogizing to the rule lOb-5 context, dismissed the plaintiffs' section 206 claim 
because plaintiffs suffered no out-of-pocket losses as a result of defendants' fraudulent 
acts. The issue whether "actual losses" should be restricted to out-of-pocket losses in 
section 206 actions is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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Walston & Co.,105 the district court apparently abandoned the causa-
tion requirement and relied instead on the Second Circuit's opinion 
in Pearlstein v. Scudder & German196 to permit a plaintiff who was in 
pari delicto to recoup her losses from a defendant who had engaged 
in a fraudulent scheme violative of both rule 1 0b-5 and section 
206.107 What the Courtland court overlooked, however, was the fact 
that, although plaintiff in Pearlstein had been in pari delicto, his losses 
clearly had resulted from the allegedly fraudulent conduct. Allow-
ance of recovery without a causal connection seems unnecessary in 
light of the availability of both restitutionary recovery and SEC 
sanctions. Moreover, in the absence of a causation requirement, 
advisers could be subjected to liability grossly disproportionate to the 
wrong; qualified individuals might thus be deterred from entering the 
advisory field-a result Congress wanted to avoid. 
E .. Scienter 
Establishing a scienter requirement doubtless will be one of the 
most difficult tasks for courts constructing a section 206 cause of 
action. As Professor Bromberg has stated: "One of the most trouble-
some aspects of fraud litigation is the requisite state of mind of the 
parties. The complexities relate primarily to the defendant and focus 
initially on what scienter or state of mind (in terms of intent, purpose, 
knowledge or belief) is necessary to frame a cause of action against 
him."108 When conduct not involving misrepresentation or nondis-
closure is at issue, courts may find the imposition of strict liability 
often appropriate. Most such violations turn on unlawful adviser/ 
broker-dealer or adviser/ client arrangements, or unlawful fee ar-
rangements. Unless advisers are allowed the unusual defense of 
ignorance of the law, it should suffice to show that the adviser knew. 
of the arrangement. 
195. 340 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
196. 429 F.2d 1136 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). 
197. The alleged violation involved a scheme whereby the adviser would "tip" his 
individual clients as to stock later recommended to subscribers in a newsletter 
published by the adviser. The court emphatically upheld plaintiffs right to recover 
under both section 206 and section 10 (b) of the Exchange Act: 
I find that defendants were making recommendations to customers of stocks 
prior to the appearance thereof in the weekly market letter, and were offering to 
give plaintiff, and presumably others, the benefit of advance notice of what 
would appear in the market letter. This, without more, is a fraudulent and de-
ceptive device in connection with the sale of securities. It had as its purpose, 
effective in the case of plaintiff, to induce the sale of securities which she owned, 
through defendants, and the purchase of securities recommended by defendants. 
This, of course, generated a trading volume, and produced brokers, commissions 
beneficial both to the registered representatives advising plaintiff and to [plain-
tiffs broker]. Use of this device, without more, gives rise to liability, although 
it is satisfactorily established that the securities recommended were considered 
"good" recommendations, and that the sales recommendations made are justi-
fied ••.• 
198. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 161, § 8.4(000), at 203. 
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More difficulties arise in establishing scienter for misrepresenta-
tion and nondisclosure since advisers cannot be required to know 
everything about the corporations whose securities they recommend. 
The scienter requirement for actions under rule lOb-5, to which 
analogy again is appropriate, remains unclear.100 Although courts 
have generally agreed that plaintiff need prove something less than 
common-law fraud to state a claim under rule l0b-5,200 there has 
been little agreement as to what that "something less" must be. The 
Second and Ninth Circuits, in particular, have traditionally taken 
opposite positions on whether proof of defendant's negligence alone is 
enough to sustain a rule 1 0b-5 claim;201 the Ninth Circuit has 
generally found negligence sufficient202 while the Second Circuit has 
not.203 In recent years, however, both circuits have moved away 
from the approach of framing the issue in terms of "scienter" and 
have begun to focus instead on whether the defendant owed a duty of 
disclosure to plaintiff in the circumstances of the case and whether 
that duty was breached. 204 The Second Circuit has formulated a 
fairly strict standard of "duty" under rule 1 0b-5: "The standard 
for determining liability under Rule l 0b-5 essentially is whether 
plaintiff has established that defendant either knew the mate-
rial facts that were misstated or omitted and should have realized 
their significance, or failed or refused to ascertain and disclose 
such facts when they were readily available to him and he had 
reasonable grounds to believe that they existed."205 The Ninth 
Circuit, on the other hand, has chosen to remain more flexible 
in light of the "varied factual contexts" in which rule 1 0b-5 
claims arise206 and has articulated various considerations for deter-
mining a particular defendant's duty of disclosure under that rule: 
Without limiting the trial court from making additions or adaptations 
in a particular case, we feel the court should, in instructing on a de-
fendant's duty under rule l0b-5, require the jury to consider the rela-
tionship of the defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant's access to 
199. See generally id. §§ 8.4(500)-(690). 
200. Id. § 8.4(501 ), at 204.101. 
201. For a general comparison of Second and Ninth Circuit opinions regarding 
scienter in rule lOb-5 actions, see Note, Scienter and Rule I0b-5: Development of a 
New Standard • .• , 23 Cl.EV. ST. L. REV. 493, 500-11 (1974). 
202. See, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); 
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). 
203. See, e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 
1971); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). 
204. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1974); Lanza v. 
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane); Chris-Craft Industries, 
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 
(1973). 
205. Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 857 (1973). 
206. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 732-35 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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the information as compared to the plaintiff's access, the benefit that 
the defendant derives from the relationship, the defendant's aware-
ness of whether the plaintiff was relying upon their relationship in 
making his investment decisions and the defendant's activity in initi-
ating the securities transaction in question. 207 
Section 206 private actions involving misrepresentation and non-
disclosure provide an appropriate context in which to apply this 
"duty /breach" approach to scienter problems. As phrased by the 
Supreme Court in Capital Gains, an adviser has toward his client "an 
affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of 
all material facts.' "208 In light of the fiduciary nature of this rela-
tionship, courts facing allegations of nondisclosure should require 
more of advisers than that they ascertain and disclose material facts 
that are "readily available," as the Second Circuit has done in the rule 
1 0b-5 context. Because advisers are paid to unearth facts material to 
the investment decision, a standard of reasonable diligence seems 
more appropriate. 
In dealing with allegations of misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure, 200 courts must decide whether to allow recovery for mere negli-
gence or whether a "reckless disregard" standard would be more 
justified. The kind of self-policing that would be promoted by 
allowing recovery for negligent conduct is certainly a desirable goal. 
On the other hand, while the Supreme Court in Capital Gains found 
"that Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice 
which operates 'as a fraud or deceit' upon a client, did not intend to 
require proof of intent to injure [under section 206],"210 it is suggest-
ed by the history surrounding the passage of the Advisers Act that the 
kinds of conduct Congress sought to eliminate involved "knowing" 
participation by investment advisers. 211 The exact standard courts 
employ is less important than a judicial appreciation of the fact that 
advisers are constantly called upon to render opinions on a wide 
variety of investments. Clients investing large amounts of money and 
paying for researched, reasoned determinations should reasonably 
expect a more thorough opinion than should a client investing small 
sums who asks his adviser for an immediate opinion on the worth of a 
particular security. Using prevailing industry practices as a guide and 
factoring in the materiality of the misinformation, courts should 
fashion a test that encourages responsible practices without requiring 
207. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (1974) (footnotes omitted). 
208. 375 U.S. at 194. 
209. Standards of "negligence" or "reckless disregard" will rarely be illuminating 
in the context of noninformational violations of section 206. To label as "negligent" 
the adviser who enters into an agreement that is a prima facie violation of section 206 
is to understate the culpability of the adviser vis-a-vis the client. 
210. 375 U.S. at 195. 
211. See note 6 supra and accompanying text; note 62 supra. 
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advisers to research each recommendation so thoroughly that they 
must charge fees beyond the means of the average individual investor. 
ill. CONCLUSION 
The similarities between section 206 and rule 1 0b-5 and the need 
for private enforcement of section 206 to supplement SEC efforts 
strongly recommend the judicial implication of a cause of action 
under that provision. While a section 206 action would overlap 
substantially with the private action under rule l0b-5, an implied 
private cause of action could be of significant aid, first, because of the 
lack of "in connection with" and "purchase or sale" requirements, 
second, because recovery for fraudulent activities not involving misre-
presentation and nondisclosure would be allowed, and, finally, be-
cause restitutionary recovery would be possible without a demonstra-
tion of causation. 
